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1. Introduction 
 
In 1988 Timothy May envisioned “encrypted packets and tamper-proof boxes” 1  – today 
known as blockchain technology, which is predicted to disrupt industries, such as banking, 
healthcare, real estate and the legal industry.
2
 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Article 8 enshrines the protection 
of personal data as a fundamental right.
3
 Data protection in the European Union is regulated 
by the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”)4, which on the 25th of May 
2018 became directly enforceable in all Member States in the European Union. In light of 
rapid technological developments and globalisation, the European legislator saw new 
challenges for the protection of personal data. Those developments required a strong and 
more coherent data protection framework in the Union, backed by strong enforcement in 
order for the natural persons to regain control over their personal data.
5
 
 
Although the protection of natural persons should be technologically neutral and should not 
depend on the techniques used
6
, it is not clear how several provisions of the GDPR should be 
complied with in the context of blockchain technology. This uncertainty arises in regard to the 
defining features of blockchain technology - decentralization, immutability and anonymity – 
which contradict the centralised and vertical architecture of the GDPR. As such the question 
arises whether the European data protection regime is suitable for blockchain technology. To 
conclude, the research problem is the tension of certain elements of the European data 
protection regime, and the subsequent compliance with it, vis a vis the core characteristics of 
                                                        
1
 T. May. Anarchist Manifesto - https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html 
(01.04.2019) 
2
 B. Marr. Here Are 10 Industries Blockchain Is Likely To Disrupt - 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/07/16/here-are-10-industries-blockchain-is-
likely-to-disrupt/#4db6a9fab5a2 (01.04.2019) 
3
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–407. 
Article 8(1) Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her; 
(2) Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent 
of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the 
right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified. 
4
 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 
5
 Recital 6-7 GDPR 
6
 Recital 15 GDPR 
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blockchain technology. Subsequently, the purpose of the thesis is to research whether 
blockchain and the GDPR can be reconciled as well as develop a comprehensive approach on 
the topic. 
 
In order to research the topic, three research questions will be proposed. First, whether data 
processing on a blockchain falls within the material scope of the GDPR and thus whether the 
GDPR applies to blockchain? Second, whether in decentralised data sharing it is possible to 
attribute responsibility and fulfil the territorial scope? Third, whether selected data protection 
requirements can be fulfilled in relation to blockchain? Based on the research questions the 
hypothesis of the thesis is that the data protection regime in the European Union is 
incompatible with the technology of blockchain.  
 
The research is novel, as the topic has not been researched in Estonia before. Some foreign 
scientific articles and books have been published on the topic but considering the ever-
growing need to protect the privacy of individuals, especially in the context of rapid 
technological advancement, the topic requires further research. 
 
As due to the limit restrictions, it is not possible to analyse the whole GDPR in relation to 
blockchain, only the most relevant provisions will be looked at. In addition, although on a 
national level data protection in Estonia is regulated by the Personal Data Protection Act
7
, the 
focus of this thesis will be solely on the GDPR. The justification being first that the GDPR is 
directly enforceable in all member states, and second to conduct a wider research. 
 
In order to fully understand how the technological elements relate to the legal elements, a 
short overview of the technological components must be provided. Blockchain is a form of 
electronic distributed ledger technology (hereinafter
 
 “DLT”)8 which blends together several 
existing technologies, including peer-to-peer networks, public-private key cryptography, and 
consensus mechanisms, to create what can be thought of as a highly resilient and tamper-
resistant database where people can store data in a transparent and non-reputable manner and 
engage in a variety of economic transactions pseudonymously.
9
 Blockchain, however, is only 
one, albeit the most know, type of DLT - one that compiles transactions in blocks that are 
                                                        
7
 Personal Data Protection Act - RT I, 04.01.2019, 11. 
8
 R. Girasa. Regulation of cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies : national and 
international perspectives. Cham : Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. p. 29-30. 
9
 P. De Filippi, A. Wright. Blockchain and the law : the rule of code. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2018. p. 2. 
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then chained to each other.
10
 Other DLT’s are for example IOTA, where a stream of 
transactions is entangled together rather than grouped into blocks.
11
 Although these new 
models are not blockchains per se, the term “Blockchain” is now commonly used to refer to 
distributed ledger technology in general and to the phenomenon surrounding DLT.
12
  
 
A distributed ledger is a type of database that is shared across a peer-to-peer network 
comprised of independent computers (known as ‘peers’ or ‘nodes’), often scattered across the 
globe.
13
 Blockchains operate on a vertical hierarchical structure as opposed to the client-
server model provided by most online service providers today
14
 meaning there is no central 
coordinating authority, for example a bank, for the organization of the network. 
15
 The 
information contained on a ledger can be of informative, commercial or legislative 
significance.
16
 Nodes are the devices running the DLT software that collectively maintain the 
database records
17
, having their own identical copy of the ledger.
 18
 Any changes to the ledger 
are reflected in all copies in minutes.
19
  
 
Data on the blockchain is encrypted and organized into smaller datasets referred to as 
“blocks”. 20 Each block contains a header used to organize the shared database. The core 
components of a block’s header are a unique fingerprint called hash of all transactions 
contained in that block, along with a timestamp and a hash of the previous block.
21
 Linked 
together sequentially, these “blocks” form “chains” that make up larger “blockchain” 
                                                        
10
 E. Ganne. p. 7. 
11
 What is Iota? - https://www.iota.org/get-started/what-is-iota (14.02.2019) 
12
 E. Ganne. p. 7. 
13
 Ibid. p. 2. 
14
 P. De Filippi, Blockchain and the law. p. 34. 
15
  D. Schoder. et al. Core Concepts in Peer-to-Peer Networking -
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/cb43/290129a3f85455c229285799925d2a794043.pdf 
(16.01.2019) p. 3. 
16
 Krüptograafiliste algoritmide elutsükli uuring. Cybernetica. 2017 - 
https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-
editors/publikatsioonid/kruptograafiliste_algoritmide_elutsukli_uuring_2017.pdf 
(12.01.2019) 
17
 R. Girasa. p. 29-30. 
18
 M.   Walport. Distributed  ledger  technology:  Beyond  blockchain. London:  Government  
Office  for  Science, 2016. - 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf (12.01.2019) 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 P. De Filippi, A. Wright. Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex 
Cryptographia. March 10, 2015 - https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 (06.01.2019) 
21
 P. De Filippi, Blockchain and the law. p. 22. 
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databases of transactions that broadcast a permanent record of transactions whilst maintaining 
the anonymity of users and specific content exchanged.
22
  
 
A new block of aggregated transactions will only be added to the ledger after the computers 
on the network reach consensus as to the validity of the transaction. Consensus within the 
network is achieved through different voting mechanisms, the most common of which is 
Proof of Work.
23 
A proof-of-work consensus model requires the client requesting the service 
prove that some work has been done in order to process the request. An example of proof-of-
work consensus model is the Bitcoin mining, which is a process of solving complex 
mathematical problems to validate the block.
 24
 
 
After a block has been added to the blockchain, it can no longer be deleted and the 
transactions it contains can be accessed and verified by everyone on the network.
25
 A copy of 
the blockchain is stored on every computer in the network and these computers periodically 
synchronize to make sure that all of them have the same, shared database.
26
 Because 
blockchains are widely replicated, any data stored in a blockchain is highly resilient and can 
survive even if a copy of a blokchain is corrupted or if a node on a network fails.
27
 
Furthermore, blockchains are intended to be maintained by all users in manners meant to be 
immutable, unless users arrive at a clear consensus to undertake changes.
28
 
 
Because the header of each block incorporates a hash of the preceding block’s header, anyone 
trying to modify the content stored in a block will inevitably break the chain. Even a small 
alteration will give rise to a new, unique hash tied to the altered block, and will necessarily 
trigger a change to the hashes of all subsequent blocks. Anyone willing to modify even a 
single record in the blockchain would have to go through the computationally expensive task 
of generating new hashes for every subsequent block. The most plausible way to change a 
record in the blockchain would be to engage in a “51% attack” and effectively take over the 
                                                        
22
 . Campbell-Verduyn. Bitcoin and beyond: cryptocurrencies, blockchains, and global 
governance. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, an imprint of the Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2018. p. 1. 
23
 De Filippi. Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia. p. 7. 
24
 C. L. Reyes. Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger 
Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal – Villanova Law Review. 2016: 61(1), article 5. 
pp. 191-234 (197-198). 
25
 De Filippi. Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia. p. 8. 
26
 Ibid. p. 7. 
27
 P. De Filippi, Blockchain and the law. p. 2. 
28
 M. Campbell-Verduyn. p. 1. 
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network so that the attackers can approve transactions at a rate that outpaces the rest of the 
network.
29
 Therefore the data on the blockchain is considered immutable. Conte de Leon et 
al. point out that the immutability is, however, a misconception because computational work 
is needed to modify its data while preserving the soundness, up to the strength of the hash 
function used. This does not mean that such a blockchain is immutable, but that an agent or 
set of agents with a sufficient amount of computing power has modified it, perhaps 
collaboratively.
30
 However, as such a modification requires the consensus of over half of the 
nodes, substantive computational power and financial resource, for the purposes of this thesis 
the data on blockchains shall be considered immutable. 
 
Furthermore, three types of blockchains exist: public perimissionless where no specific entity 
or entities manages the platform and which is open to everyone; private blockchains, where 
the permissions to validate and write data onto the blockchain are controlled by one entity 
which is highly trusted by the other users, and participants are identified; and a consortium 
blockchain a subtype of private blockchain that operates under the leadership of a group 
rather than a single entity and in which participants are identified.
 31
 For the purposes of the 
present thesis an example of a private blockchain – the KSI blockchain of Guardtime – and a 
public blockchain – the Bitcoin blockchain – will be used. 
 
Derived from the research question the thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter 
analyses whether data on a blockchain is personal data and whether the data is processed 
pursuant to the GDPR. Therefore the chapter answers the question whether the material scope 
of the GDPR is fulfilled. 
 
The second chapter concentrates on the data protection challenges in decentralised systems. 
More specifically, whether it is possible to define a controller in decentralized systems, as 
well as at the problem of territorial scope in decentralized systems. As a processor processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller, the primary question of the present thesis will be that 
of controllership. In addition, transfers of personal data to third countries or international 
organisations will be touched upon as part of the territorial scope in order to highlight the 
problems of distributed ledgers.  
                                                        
29
 P. De Filippi, Blockchain and the law. p. 25. 
30
 D. Conte de Leon, et al. Blockchain: properties and misconceptions - Asia Pacific Journal 
of Innovation and Entrepreneurship. 2017:11(3) pp. 286-300 (290) 
31
 E. Ganne. Can blockchain revolutionize international trade?. Geneva : World Trade 
Organization, 2018. p. 9-11. 
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The third chapter considers the data protection requirements in the European Union. More 
specifically, first principles will be looked at as they provide the foundations for European 
data protection law.
32
 Second, the legal ground for processing will be assessed. Third, rights 
of the data subject will be looked at. As part of the third chapter only the most relevant 
provisions in relation to blockchain will be analysed. 
 
To answer the research question, mostly systematic and analytical methods have been used in 
all chapters. The analytical method has been used to analyse the suitability of blockchain 
technology to the data protection regime. 
 
The basis of this thesis is the GDPR. However, in order to understand the GDPR, the opinions 
of Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (hereinafter “29WP”) and the European Data 
Protection Board (hereinafter “EDPB”), have been used. Since 25th of May 2018 the 29WP 
has been succeeded by the EDPB, an independent European body composed of 
representatives of the national data protection authorities, and the European Data Protection 
Supervisor.
33
 Albeit not legally binding, the opinion of the WP29, now succeeded by the 
EDPB, possesses undeniable “persuasive authority” and provides the most comprehensive 
guidelines for data controllers as to how they should apply the concept of personal data in 
their day-to-day practice. 
34
 In addition, Judges and Data Protection Authorities often follow 
their interpretation.
35
 However, due to the advisory nature of the opinions, it is also important 
to look at the interpretation of personal data in the case law of the CJEU of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter “CJEU”). Finally, the research articles by Michele Finck, 
Matthias Brebereich and Malgorzata Steiner, Lokke Moerel as well as Thomas Buocz et al. 
have been used to construct the legal arguments. 
 
                                                        
32
 D. Kelleher, K. Murray. EU data protection law. Dublin : Bloomsbury Professional( 2018). 
p. 137. 
33
 European Data Protection Board. About EDPB - https://edpb.europa.eu/about-edpb/about-
edpb_en (29.04.2019) 
34
 N. Purtova. The law of everything. Broad concept of personal data and future of EU data 
protection law - Law, Innovation and Technology. 2018: 10(1) pp. 40-81 (43) 
35
 F. Zuiderveen Borgesius - Singling Out People Without Knowing Their Names – 
Behavioural Targeting, Pseudonymous Data, and the New Data Protection Regulation. 
February 16, 2016 - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733115 
(01.02.2019), p. 10. 
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The keywords provided by the Estonian Subject Thesaurus that best characterise the current 
master’s thesis are the following: data protection, blockchain technology, personal data, data 
processing. 
2. Personal data processing on blockchain 
 
2.1. Personal data  
 
The material scope of the GDPR is laid down in Article 2, which states “the regulation applies 
to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing 
other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are 
intended to form part of a filing system”. Therefore the GDPR applies to data that is (1) 
personal and (2) being processed by automated means with (3) none of the exceptions in 
Article 2(2) present.  
 
Personal data is defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person (‘data subject’)”.36 An identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly 
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification 
number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, 
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.
37
 
The 29WP outlines four elements of the definition of personal data: (1) any information, (2) 
relating to, (3) identified or identifiable, (4) natural person.  
 
The first element of the definition is “any information” which clearly signals the willingness 
of the legislator to design a broad concept of personal data. The concept of personal data 
covers any sort of statements about a person – both objective information, such as the 
presence of a certain substance in one’s blood, and subjective information, such as opinions or 
assessments. Furthermore, the information does not have to be true or proven. 
38
 In terms of 
content “personal data” includes data providing any sort of information, covering both 
“sensitive data” (corresponding to GDPR Article 9 special categories of data) and more 
                                                        
36
 Article 4(1) GDPR 
37
 Article 4(1) GDPR 
38
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data. 
WP 136. Brussels: 2007 - https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2007/wp136_en.pdf (07.02.2019) p. 6. 
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general data. The term “personal data” includes information touching the individual’s private 
and family life stricto sensu, but also information regarding whatever types of activity is 
undertaken by the individual, like economic behaviour of the individual.
39
 Finally, in terms of 
format, personal data includes information available in whatever form, be it alphabetical, 
numerical, graphical, photographical or acoustical.
40
 It can be on paper, in a computer 
memory as binary code, structured or in free text or a document.
41
 A voice recording or a 
child’s drawing can also be considered personal data.42 
 
The CJEU has stated several times in the case law that the scope of the Directive is wide and 
the personal data covered in that directive is varied.
43
 Which ties into the 29WP’s opinion of 
the broad concept of personal data. In the case Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner 
the CJEU assessed whether the written answers submitted by a candidate at a professional 
examination and any examiner’s comments with respect to those answers constitute personal 
data. The CJEU noted that “any information” is not restricted to information that is sensitive 
or private, but potentially encompasses all kinds of information, not only objective but also 
subjective, in the form of opinions and assessments, provided that it “relates” to the data 
subject.
44
  
 
The second element of the 29WP definition is “relating to”. In order to consider that data can 
“relate” to an individual three elements (content, purpose, result) must be considered as an 
alternative. If one element is present, it should be considered that the information relates to 
the individual. The content element is present in those cases where information it is about that 
individual, for example the information contained in a company’s folder under the name of a 
client. The purpose element can be considered to exist when data is used with the purpose of 
evaluating, treating in a way or influencing the status or behavior of an individual. The result 
element entails data being used to have an impact on a certain person’s rights or interests.45 
 
                                                        
39
 WP136. p. 6. 
40
 Ibid. p. 6-7. 
41
 WP136. p. 8. 
42
 Ibid. p. 8. 
43
 CJEU C‑ 553/0 College van burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v M.E.E. 
Rijkeboer, para 59; CJEU C‑ 434/16, Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner, para 33; 
CJEU C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist, para. 88. 
44
 CJEU C‑ 434/16, Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner, para. 34. 
45
 WP136. p. 10-11. 
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The CJEU has also assessed the element “relating to”. The first time was in the case of YS and 
others vs Minister voor Immigratie where the CJEU assessed whether the data relating to the 
applicant for a residence permit and the legal analysis included in the application (the 
“minute”) can be considered personal data. The CJEU found that “there is no doubt that the 
data relating to the applicant for a residence permit and contained in a minute, such as the 
applicant’s name, date of birth, nationality, gender, ethnicity, religion and language, are 
information relating to that natural person, who is identified in that minute in particular by his 
name, and must consequently be considered to be ‘personal data’”.46 As for the legal analysis, 
the CJEU stated that it “may contain personal data, it does not in itself constitute such data”.47 
Therefore the CJEU appears to interpret “information relating to” narrowly as information 
about an individual and rejects the broader approach of 29WP’s opinion where information 
can also relate to an individual not by virtue of its content, but by reason of the purpose or 
effect of it’s processing.48 
 
However, the CJEU revisited the element in the case Nowak where the court stated that 
information ‘relates’ to the data subject when the information, by reason of its content, 
purpose or effect, is linked to a particular person.
49
 First the court stated that the content of the 
answers in the written examination reflect the extent of the candidate’s knowledge and 
competence in a given field and, in some cases, his intellect, thought processes, and judgment. 
In the case of a handwritten script, the answers contain, in addition, information as to his 
handwriting.
50
 Second, the purpose of collecting the examination answers is to evaluate the 
candidate’s professional abilities and his suitability to practice the profession concerned.51 
And third, use of that information, one consequence of that use being the candidate’s success 
or failure at the examination concerned, is liable to have an effect on his or her rights and 
interests, in that it may determine or influence, for example, the chance of entering the 
profession aspired to or of obtaining the post sought.
52
 Therefore the CJEU adopted the 
alternative test of content, purpose or effect used by 29WP, effectively reversing the 
restrictive view of “information relating to” in YS and others.53 
                                                        
46
 CJEU joined cases C‑ 141/12 and C‑ 372/12, YS v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en 
Asiel, and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v M, S, para. 38. 
47
 Ibid. para. 39. 
48
 N. Purtova. p. 68. 
49
 CJEU C‑ 434/16, para. 34-35. 
50
 Ibid. para. 37. 
51
 Ibid. para. 38. 
52
 Ibid. para. 39. 
53
 N. Purtova. p. 72. 
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The third element requires the natural person to be “identified or identifiable”. A natural 
person can be considered as “identified” when, within a group of persons, he or she is 
“distinguished” from all other members of the group. This also includes the possibility of said 
distinguishing.
54
 Identification is further broken down into direct and indirect. Direct 
identification is for example someone being identified by name, while indirect identification 
is when through the collection of unique identifiers a person might still be identifiable even 
though those identifiers alone will not allow to single out a person.
55
  
 
It is also important to consider the means likely or reasonably used by the controller or third 
person to identify the data subject. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be 
used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as 
the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the 
available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments.
56
 All 
factors should be considered, such as cost conducting identification, the intended purpose, the 
structuring of processing, the advantage expected by the controller, the interests at stake for 
the individuals, as well as risk of organizational dysfunctions (e.g. breaches of confidentiality 
duties) and technical failures.
57
 If a possibility to identify does not exist or is negligible, the 
person should not be considered as identifiable and the information would not be considered 
“personal data”.58 Furthermore, where the purpose of the processing implies the identification 
of individuals, it can be assumed that the controller or any other person involved will have the 
means “likely reasonably to be used” to identify the data subject. Such could be the case for 
example in video surveillance, as the sole purpose of it is to identify the persons seen in the 
video images.
59
 
 
The standard for identifiability was set in the Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
case. Static IP addresses are considered personal data
60
. The CJEU ruled that dynamic IP 
addresses on their own do not constitute personal data, because such an address does not 
                                                        
54
 WP136. p. 12. 
55
 Ibid. p. 13. 
56
 Recital 26 GDPR 
57
 WP136. p. 15. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 WP136. p. 16. 
60
 CJEU C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs 
SCRL (SABAM), para. 51. 
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directly reveal the identity of the natural person.
61
 Then the CJEU assesses whether the 
dynamic IP addresses combined with other information provided by the Internet service 
provider would render the data subject identifiable. The CJEU proceeded to note that an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified directly or indirectly.
62
 To determine whether 
a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used 
either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said person.
63
 The CJEU noted 
that or information to be treated as ‘personal data’ it does not have to be in the hands of one 
person.
64
  
 
The CJEU found that identification would not be possible if the identification of the data 
subject was prohibited by law or practically impossible on account of the fact that it requires a 
disproportionate effort in terms of time, cost and man-power, so that the risk of identification 
appears in reality to be insignificant.
65
 Although in Germany it is not possible for internet 
service providers (hereinafter “ISP”) to transfer the data directly to the online media service 
provider, in the event of a cyber attack the online media services provider is able to contact 
the competent authority, so that the latter can take the steps necessary to obtain that 
information from the ISP and to bring criminal proceedings.
66
 Therefore in Breyer dynamic IP 
addresses were found to be personal information. 
 
It is important to note that the CJEU adopted a more restrictive approach to what would 
reasonably likely than the. Namely identification would not be reasonably likely if prohibited 
by law. The 29WP names a possibility of organizational dysfunction, meaning also data 
security breaches resulting from illegal acts, among the relevant factors to be assessed, which 
is in direct contradiction with the CJEU.
67
  
 
Finally, data protection rules apply to natural persons. This means that information relating to 
both dead persons and legal persons fall outside the scope of the GDPR. However, in some 
instances aforementioned information may relate to natural persons and therefore the data 
                                                        
61
 CJEU C‑ 582/14, Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland. para. 38. 
62
 Ibid. para. 40. 
63
 Ibid. para. 42. 
64
 Ibid. para. 43. 
65
 Ibid. para. 46. 
66
 CJEU C‑ 582/14, para. 47. 
67
 N.Purtova. pp. 64-65. 
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protection rules would apply indirectly. That would be the case for example where the legal 
name of the legal person derives from that of a natural person.
68
  
 
Looking at the four criteria in union, it becomes evident that the WP29 leaves the scope of 
“personal data” very wide. Several authors 69  have argued that in the age of rapid 
technological advancement and machine data processing, especially big data, the wide scope 
of personal data could lead to a scenario where everything is personal data. As a result, the 
intensive compliance regime of the GDPR will become “the law of everything”, well meant 
but impossible to maintain.
 70
  
 
The principles of data protection should not apply to anonymous information, namely 
information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal 
data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer 
identifiable.
71
 An important factor is that the processing must be irreversible.
72
 Therefore 
anonymous data falls outside the scope of the GDPR. Pseudonymous data however, still 
constitutes personal data.
73
 Pseudonymisation is the processing of personal data in such a 
manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the 
use of additional information.
74
 According to the WP29 both encryption and hashing 
constitute pseudonymisation techniques.
75
  
 
A separate category of personal data is “sensitive data”76 – data, which is by its nature, 
particularly sensitive in relation to fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.
77
 
Special data is personal data which reveals racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious 
or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, 
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biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health 
or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation.
78
  
 
These personal data are considered as sensitive (as this term is commonly understood) 
because they are linked to household and private activities (such as electronic 
communications whose confidentiality should be protected), or because they impact the 
exercise of a fundamental right (such as location data whose collection questions the freedom 
of movement) or because their violation clearly involves serious impacts in the data subject’s 
daily life (such as financial data that might be used for payment fraud).
79
 
 
2.2. Data on blockchain 
 
On the blockchain records are stored one after the other in a continuous ledger
80
 into 
“blocks”. 81 Each block contains a header used to organize the shared database. The core 
components of a block’s header are a unique fingerprint called hash of all transactions 
contained in that block, along with a timestamp and a hash of the previous block.
82
 Linked 
together sequentially, these “blocks” form “chains” that make up larger “blockchain” 
databases of transactions that broadcast a permanent record of transactions whilst maintaining 
the anonymity of users and specific content exchanged.
83
  
 
DLT’s rely on a two-step verification process with asymmetric encryption. Every user has a 
public key
84
, best of thought as an account number that is shared with others to enable 
transactions. In addition, each user has a private key, which is best thought of as a password 
that must never be shared with others. Both keys have a mathematical relationship by virtue 
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of which the private key can decrypt data that is encrypted through the public key. Public 
keys thus hide the identity of the individual unless they are linked to additional identifiers.
85
  
 
Thus two types of data are stored on a blockchain – the data, which is stored in blocks and the 
public key. The information contained on a ledger in blocks can be of informative, 
commercial or legislative significance.
86
 Although Guardtime’s blockchain is Keyless 
Signature Infrastructure (KSI), which relies on cryptographic properties of hash functions and 
the availability of widely published verification codes, rather than the secrecy of private 
keys
87, it is rather something specific to Guartime’s technology.  
 
In the case of Guardtime’s KSI blockchain, which is the underlying technology of Estonia’s 
e-Health platform, the blocks contain medical data about a patient, such as blood type, 
allergies, recent treatments, test results, on-going medication including information about 
prescriptions or pregnancy. 
88
 Said data relates to the patient in terms of content, as it is about 
the data subject. Furthermore, as said data is personal data related to the physical or mental 
health of a natural person, including the provision of health care services, which reveal 
information about his or her health status,
89
 the data concerns health pursuant Article 9(1) and 
merits special protection under the European data protection regime.  
 
The Bitcoin blockchain lists transfers of Bitcoins between different addresses.
90
 Every 
transfer consists of elements that the user determines directly - the input and output addresses 
and the transferred value, as well as elements containing the metadata, which are the transfer 
hash and time that the transfer’s block was mined.91 The Bitcoin address is generated from 
and corresponds to a public key and it is used the same way as the beneficiary name on a 
                                                        
85
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cheque (i.e. “Pay to the order of ”). 92  It should also be noted that the instruction 
OP_RETURN allows saving arbitrary data on the Bitcoin blockchain.
93
 However, arbitrary 
data is more of an exception, than a rule, as OP_RETURN transactions constitute ∼ 0.96% of 
the total transactions in the blockchain.
94
 Therefore the analysis will focus on the transactional 
and metadata. Bitcoin users are natural people, thus the data contained on a Bitcoin 
blockchain is any information, such as information alluding to financial behaviour
95
 relating 
to the user. 
 
As the data stored in blocks is encrypted and encryption is considered a pseudonymisation 
technique
96
, the data stored on a blockchain does not allow for direct identification of the data 
subject. Similarly public keys are hashed which permits direct identification. Therefore 
according to the 29WP definition of personal data, it must be assessed whether combined with 
additional information the data subject could be identified. Applying the Breyer standard 
identification would not be possible if it is prohibited by law or requires disproportionate 
effort.
97
 In the current examples this appears not to be the case.  
 
For example Bitcoin users disclose their addresses intentionally when interacting with online 
wallet service providers, exchange platform providers, or Bitcoin merchants.
98
 Bitcoin users 
can be identified through mapping their Bitcoin addresses to IP addresses
99
 or by clustering 
the addresses
100
. It should be noted that Bitcoin users could hide their identity using proxy or 
anonymity services, such as Tor.
101
 However, even Tor or other anonymity service can be cut-
off.
102
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There are numerous examples where metadata combined with information about person from 
an outside source allows for the identification of the individual.
103
 Therefore drawing a 
parallel to Breyer, data identification should be very likely and thus both data contained on 
blocks and the public keys should be considered personal data pursuant to Article 4(1). 
 
Such an opinion is shared by Michele Finck who concludes that encrypted and hashed 
transactional data – data stored on blocks revealing individual behaviour in Internet of Things 
use cases, digital identities, or financial and medical data – as well as public keys, are 
considered personal data under the GDPR.
104
 Matthias Berberich and Malgorzata Steiner 
conclude similarly that even if additional information may be necessary to attribute 
information to the data subject, such information would be merely pseudonymised and count 
as personal information. Adding that a connection between pseudonymised data and the data 
subject will usually (and necessarily) arise in blockchain transactions affected for off-chain 
goods, e.g. conversion into real money payments, purchase of goods or services, registration 
data, where the transaction parties must be known.
105
 
 
Moubry and others argue that if the precedent set by Breyer is to be applied to data, which has 
undergone pseudonymisation under the GDPR, it should be possible for these data to be 
rendered anonymous in some circumstances. In their example where Public Authority A 
provides administrative Research Centre B who strips the data of all identifying information, 
which is kept separately with technical and organizational controls to prevent the reattribution 
to the research data. Then the data is shared with an external researcher, who has no 
relationship with either A or B. Moubry and others argue that the pseudonymised data would 
not be personal data for the researcher if the researcher has no means reasonably likely to 
identify the data subjects.
106
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If the identification is practically impossible on account of the fact that it requires a 
disproportionate effort in terms of time, cost and man-power as pointed by the CJEU in 
Breyer
107
, the identification of data subjects by the independent researcher should be denied. 
 
2.3. Processing of personal data 
 
Article 4(2) defines “processing” as any operation or set of operations which is performed on 
personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as 
collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, 
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction.
108
 In order to fall under the 
material scope of the GDPR processing has to be wholly or partly by automated means. Data 
is processed by automated means when manual interim steps are not required.
109
  
 
The CJEU has ruled that operation of loading personal data on an internet page must be 
considered to be such “processing”. 110  THE CJEU noted in Bodil Linqvist that placing 
information on an internet page is performed, at least in part, automatically.
111
 In addition in 
Heinz Huber v Bundesrepublik Deutschland the CJEU found that the storage and transmission 
of personal data by the body responsible for the management of the register in which they are 
kept thus represents the “processing of personal data”.112  
 
Blockchain is a distributed ledger - a type of database that is shared across a peer-to-peer 
network comprised of independent computers (known as ‘peers’ or ‘nodes’), often scattered 
across the globe.
113
 Records are stored one after the other in a continuous ledger in blocks and 
can only be added when the participants reach a quorum.
114
 A copy of the blockchain is stored 
                                                        
107
 Ibid. para. 46. 
108
 Article 4(2) GDPR 
109
 T. Buocz, et al. Bitcoin and the GDPR: Allocating responsibility in distributed networks - 
Computer Law & Security Review. 2019: 35(1), pp. 182-198 (190). 
110
 CJEU C‑ 131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, para. 26; CJEU C-101/01, para. 25. 
111
 CJEU C-101/01, para. 26. 
112
 CJEU C‑ 524/06, Heinz Huber v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, para. 43. 
113
 P. De Filippi, A. Wright. p. 2. 
114
 R. Maull, et al. p.483 
 20 
on every computer in the network and these computers periodically synchronize to make sure 
that all of them have the same, shared database.
115
  
 
For example in the Bitcoin blockchain after a user has created a new transfer, the transfer gets 
broadcasted to and stored in the network without human intervention. The process is carried 
out automatically by the nodes of the network according to the blockchain protocol and 
requires no manual interim steps.
116
 As storing constitutes processing and no manual interim 
steps are required for that process, data on the blockchain is processed by automated means.  
 
The exceptions to the material scope are found in Article 2(2). Pursuant to Article 2(2) the 
GDPR does not apply to personal data, which is processed: in the course of an activity which 
falls outside the scope of Union law; by the Member States when carrying out activities which 
fall within the scope of Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU; by a natural person in the course of a 
purely personal or household activity; or by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public 
security.  
 
Of the selection the “household exception” would be the most relevant to blockchain. A 
personal or household activity as processing with no connection to a professional or 
commercial activity, which could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or 
social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. 
117
 In 
the case of a private blockchain, such as Guardtime’s KSI blockchain, the processing does not 
take place in the course of a household activity. Therefore, the exception does not apply. 
However, the exception could apply in the case of a public blockchain, such as Bitcoin as it 
can be argued that a natural person who downloads the blockchain and runs it on their 
computer has no connection to a professional or commercial activity. 
 
The French National Commission on Informatics and Liberty (hereinafter “CNIL”) is of the 
opinion that natural persons who enter personal data on the blockchain, that do not relate to a 
professional or commercial activity, are not data controllers (pursuant to the “purely personal 
or household activity” exclusion set out in Article 2 of the GDPR). For example, a natural 
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person who buys or sells Bitcoin, on his or her own behalf, is not a data controller. However, 
the said person can be considered a data controller if these transactions are carried out as part 
of a professional or commercial activity, on behalf of other natural persons.
118
 
 
Furthermore, CJEU ruled that publication of personal data on the internet so that the data is 
made accessible to an indefinite number of people does not constitute processing in the course 
of private or family life of individuals.
119
 Drawing a parallel to Bodil Linqvist it should be 
concluded that as a public permissionless blockchain, such as Bitcoin, is available for anyone 
to download and therefore the data will be available to an indefinite number of people, 
processing data on a public permissionless blockchain does not fall under the household 
exception pursuant to Article 2(2). Thomas Buocz et al. share such an opinion pointing out 
that the household exemption includes information disclosed to a limited circle of addresses 
(e.g. in direct messages to one or more recipients). On the contrary, social media posts that are 
available to an undefined public audience are not included in the household exemption. 
Thomas Buocz et al. conclude that like social media posts, Bitcoin transfers are broadcasted 
to the entire network. They can be viewed by every internet user and therefore do not fall 
within the household exemption.
120
 Although Buocz et al. conclusion is made about Bitcoin 
exclusively, it applies to all public permissionless blockchains. 
3. Decentralised data sharing on blockchain 
3.1.  Defining the controller 
 
Article 5(2) states that “the controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate 
compliance with, [the principles of data protection pursuant to Article 5(1)]”.  Other 
provisions point to the controller taking on the responsibility for compliance with the GDPR. 
121
 According to Article 24(1) the controller shall implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to ensure and be able to demonstrate that processing is performed in 
accordance with the GDPR. The 29WP has also stressed that clearly identifying the natural or 
legal person responsible for breaches of data protection law is a perquisite for the effective 
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application of the GDPR.
122
 Furthermore, the question of controllership is also important in 
determining the material scope of the GDPR as per Article 3.  
 
It becomes apparent that the GDPR is structured in a vertical hierarchical structure with the 
controller taking on the accountability for compliance, followed by the processor who acts on 
behalf of the controller and finally the data subject exercising their rights. However, 
blockchain technology is a hierarchical structure with the data subject interacting with all the 
other actors on the network. Thus, distributed ledgers pose a challenge for regulatory 
approaches that hinge on central intermediaries.
123
 The inability to pin-point a controller 
could have serious implications for the entire data protection framework in the GDPR and 
many of the data subject’s rights would be rendered useless e.g. the right to data retention, 
access and portability, security breach notifications and most importantly it would be difficult 
to coerce compliance with the heavy fines.
124
 Therefore establishing the controller on a 
blockchain network is a crucial preliminary step. Furthermore, as a processor processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller, the primary question of the present thesis is that of 
controllership. 
 
Article 4(7) of the GDPR defines the controller as “a natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means 
of the processing of personal data”. Therefore the definition contains three key elements.  
 
The first element is “natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body”. This 
element of the definition refers to the personal side: who can be a controller and is crucial in 
determining liability and imposing sanctions.
125
 The concept of controller is also an essential 
element in determining which national law is applicable.
126
 The 29WP notes that in 
determining the controller preference should be given to a company or body, rather than a 
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specific person within the company or body.
127
 Likewise the GDPR favours a clear and 
univocal appointment of the controller, irrespective of whether a formal appointment has been 
made and publicised.
128
 If a natural person working within a company or public body uses 
data for his or her own purposes, outside the activities of the company, this person shall be 
considered as de facto controller and will be liable as such.
129
  
 
The second element is “alone or jointly with others”. Joint controllership, a category, which 
was not present in the Directive 95/46/EC
130
, shall be analysed in the next section.  
 
The final element “determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data” is 
the one that requires the most examination. First the word “determines” points to control 
exercised by the controller. It should be noted that the concept of a controller is based on a 
factual rather than a formal analysis therefore it is possible to be a controller irrespective of a 
specific competence or power conferred by law.
131
 Control can stem from legal competence, 
implicit competence, such as the employer in relation to it’s employees, and factual influence. 
The latter is the most problematic and more likely to lead to divergent interpretations. A 
remedy for this could be the analysis of contractual relationships between parties. Elements, 
such as the degree of actual control exercised by a party, the image given to data subjects and 
reasonable expectations of data subjects on the basis of this visibility could all be pointers to 
the factual controller.
132
  
 
Furthermore, determining the “purposes and means” of the processing amounts to 
determining the “how” and “why” of processing of personal data. It is also important to 
consider the level of control someone details as the controller exercises the highest level of 
control while the processor acts on behalf of the controller.
133
 “Purpose” is an anticipated 
outcome that is intended or that guides one’s planned actions, while “means” is how a result 
is obtained or an end achieved.
134
 The controller determines the “purpose” of the processing, 
as well as substantial questions, which are essential to the core of the lawfulness of 
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processing.
135
 Determination of the “means” includes both technical and organizational 
questions, such as “which data shall be processed?”, “which third parties will have access to 
this data?”, “when shall data be deleted?”. The decision of the “means” can be delegated to 
processors.
136
 Therefore whoever decides the “purpose” of processing is the de facto 
controller.
137
 
 
3.1.1. Joint controllers 
 
According to Article 26(1) “where two or more controllers jointly determine the purposes and 
means of processing, they shall be joint controllers”. Furthermore joint controllers “shall in a 
transparent manner determine their respective responsibilities for compliance with the 
obligations under [the GDPR] in particular as regards the exercising of the rights of the data 
subject and their respective duties to provide the information referred to in Articles 13 and 14, 
by means of an arrangement between them unless, and in so far as, the respective 
responsibilities of the controllers are determined by Union or Member State law to which the 
controllers are subject”. The arrangement should duly reflect the respective roles and 
relationships of the joint controllers vis-à-vis the data subjects and its essence shall be made 
available to the data subject.
138
 Such an arrangement requires a clear allocation of the 
responsibilities.
139
 The data subject may exercise their rights in respect of and against each of 
the controllers, irrespective of the terms of the arrangement.
140
  
 
Joint control will arise when different parties determine with regard to specific processing 
operations either the purpose or those essential elements of the means, which characterize a 
controller.
141
 The participation of the parties does not need to be equally shared.
142
 However, 
the mere fact that subjects cooperate in processing of personal data, for example in a chain, 
does not entail that they are joint controllers in all cases, since an exchange of data between to 
parties without sharing purposes or means in a common set of operations should be 
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considered only as a transfer of data between separate controllers.
143
 Therefore in order to 
fulfil the criteria of joint controllership it is important to determine the purpose and means of 
processing, doing it in a clear and transparent manner by mutual agreement.  
 
3.1.2. Controllership on a blockchain 
 
While centralized solutions rely on pre-established trust between the central authority and the 
parties in the transaction
144
, blockchains operate on a vertical hierarchical structure as 
opposed to the client-server model provided by most online service providers today.
145
 This 
means that there is no central coordinating authority, for example a bank, for the organization 
of the network.
146
 A copy of the blockchain is shared to each node across a peer-to-peer 
network. These shared databases operate globally and extend across national borders.
147
 
 
In the traditional client-provider model, it is relatively easy to identify the controller - there is 
almost always an entity that is offering some product or service, or an agency fulfilling some 
function, that determines the purpose and means for processing, sets up the systems to do it, 
and collects and processes the data for the data subject. If several entities are jointly offering a 
product or service, they can be identified as joint controllers.
148
 
 
The CNIL in their guidelines considers that participants, who have the right to write on the 
chain and who decide to send data for validation by the miners, can be considered data 
controllers. More specifically, a natural person and that the personal data processing operation 
is related to a professional or commercial activity (i.e. when the activity is not strictly 
personal) or a legal person who registers personal data on a blockchain. For example a notary 
recording their client’s property deed on a blockchain or a bank entering its clients’ data onto 
a blockchain as part of its client management processing – are the controllers.149 
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In case of a private blockchain it is possible to identify a controller (or several controllers in 
case of a consortium blockchain) – the controller is the natural or legal person who 
determines the purposes and means of processing. For instance, in the case of the e-Health 
platform provided by Guardtime’s KSI blockchain – the purposes and means of processing 
are determined by the Ministry of Social Affairs, while the processor is Health and Welfare 
Information Systems Centre.
150
 Several authors support such an interpretation.
151
 In a public 
permissionless blockchain allocating responsibility and thus identifying a controller can be 
more difficult. Further analysis will try to answer the question of who is the controller on a 
public permissionless blockchain.  
 
In a public permissionless blockchain there is no central point of control as the network is 
operated by all nodes in a decentralised fashion.
152
 Each node has their own copy of the 
blockchain stored on their computer on the network and the computers periodically 
synchronize through the P2P network, the nodes are in charge of carrying out transactions and 
thus distributing the information to all other nodes.
153
 The responsibility for compliance in 
public networks could thus be attributed to either individual nodes, the nodes collectively or 
software developers. 
 
Nodes can be divided into participating nodes and validating nodes. Validating nodes are 
allowed to add data to the ledger, according to the consensus mechanism. Participating nodes 
store synchronised copies of the data. If a user is connected to a participating note, they can 
add new data to the ledger, but this data needs to be sent to the participating node first, and 
then submitted to a validating node.
154
 In a public, permissionless network, anyone is allowed 
to become a participating node or a validating node - there is no network owner, no sign-up 
procedure, no registration, and no restrictions on who can do this. The open source software is 
developed and maintained by changing groups of volunteers, and it exists ‘in the wild’ as a 
tool that people can choose to use or not.
155
 Therefore one interpretation would be to consider 
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the natural or legal person behind each node to be the controller if they determine the purpose 
and means of processing.  
 
Downloading the full node, running it and participating in the blockchain network or deciding 
when to participate, could be considered exercising control by the node. However, a controller 
must also determine the “purposes and means” of the processing. Due to the immutable 
properties of blockchain, nodes cannot alter the data of a block, nor delete it. Altering a block 
would require 51% of the nodes to reach consensus on the alternations, otherwise the 
deviating block would be rejected from the chain. Running the blockchain application is not 
enough to constitute deciding the means of processing and if a node has no effect on the 
processing of data on a block it is doubtful they can determine the purpose of processing.
 156
 
For example in a Bitcoin blockchain, the users determine if a transfer is created and to whom 
and how much Bitcoin are being transferred.
157
 The purpose of data processing is always the 
transfer of Bitcoin, which cannot be altered by the user.
158
 Furthermore, nodes do not decide 
on the means of processing as they have no effect on which data is processed, which third 
parties will have access to the data and when will said data be deleted. Therefore each 
individual node could be considered a controller if they decide on the purpose and means of 
processing of personal data. However, an individual node does not determine the purpose and 
means of processing and hence cannot be considered the controller pursuant Article 4(7).  
 
Michele Finck notes in a permissionless setting, either no node qualifies as the data controller 
in the absence of independent determination of the means and purposes of processing, or 
more likely, every node qualifies as data controller. Finck concludes that as nodes are not 
subject to external instructions and autonomously decide whether to join the chain, and pursue 
their own objective, they should be considered controllers. However, determining that each 
node is a data controller raises considerable complications as the exact number, location and 
identity of nodes on a chain cannot be established without difficulty.
 159
 For example in the 
Bitcoin blockchain there are approximately 10 612 nodes
160
 than are known of.
161
 Other 
authors reach a similar conclusion.
162
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Such conclusion is criticised by Lokke Moerel who compares blockchain technology to the 
internet – applying the question of controllership to the internet at large would result in a 
similar conundrum as when applied to public blockchain: either all technical building blocks 
of the internet would qualify as the controller or none of them would, a result that would pose 
similar data protection issues under the GDPR. None of these issues have however, hampered 
the development of the internet, for the simple reason that controllership is not based on the 
technical level of operation of the relevant technology, but who deploys this technology for a 
certain purpose. Moerel concludes that blockchain will not make middlemen obsolete but 
rather replace them. As private and consortium blockchains are emerging to meet business 
needs, as well as gain social acceptance, these blockchain applications will implement their 
membership rules. These rules in turn will also provide who the responsible entity is, as well 
as a choice of law and forum.
163
 The critique is relevant but the present analysis focuses on 
the present state of technology. Whether or not improvements future improvements will 
alleviate some of the issues with blockchain remains to be seen.  
 
Buocz et al. outline that although users running full nodes make essential contributions to the 
functioning of network, they cannot determine the purposes and means of these activities by 
themselves as the consensus building functions automatically according to code. They 
conclude that because individual users running full nodes cannot change the protocol by 
themselves or choose a different protocol, they cannot be considered controllers.
164
 Erbguth 
and Fasching conclude similarly that nodes decide whether to participate in a network or not 
but this has no effect on the functioning of the blockchain. Thus if a node has no influence on 
the processing, it is doubtful whether they determine the purposes of the processing.
165
  
 
Therefore it appears that the debate whether individual nodes constitute controllers and if so, 
whether they decide the purposes and means of processing, is on going. According to the 
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European Commission’s EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum it is not desirable to 
categorise nodes a controllers, as the debate has not been settled, as well as problems with 
enforcement.
166
 
 
It would be possible to classify all the nodes collectively as joint controllers under article 
26(1) if the nodes meet two conditions. First, it would require for all the participating nodes to 
“jointly determine the purposes and means of processing”. However, if an individual node has 
no control over the purpose and means of processing, then it is doubtful that the collective of 
nodes will. Theoretically the nodes could coordinate their actions to reach a 51% consensus 
and alter the blocks on the chain. The author would argue that in this case two or more 
controllers would at least determine the “how” or the “means” of processing.  
 
But as a second condition Article 26 also requires the determination of respective 
responsibilities for compliance in a transparent manner by means of arrangement between the 
nodes. The arrangement between joint controllers requires a “clear allocation of the 
responsibilities”.167 The GDPR does not specify the format of such an agreement but it can be 
assumed that the burden of proof will be on the joint controllers to demonstrate the clear 
allocation of responsibilities.
168
 The rules of a blockchain network stem not from an 
agreement of the nodes, but ultimately from the sum of their independent behaviour.
169
 Thus 
it is not enough that several parties act in union, but they must determine the purpose together. 
Between the node operators, however, there is usually no agreement on the purpose.
170
 The 
lack of shared purpose means the processing will result in qualifying two entities as two 
separate data controllers.
171
  
 
The discussion in academia about whether nodes can constitute joint controllers is on 
going.
172
 The author believes that in a public permissionless scenario where the exact number 
and location of nodes is unknown and the sum of the independent behaviour of the nodes 
dictates the rules of the network, not their cooperation, the collective of nodes does not 
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qualify as joint controllers pursuant Article 26 because there is no arrangement between the 
nodes. For example there is no coordination between the nodes of a Bitcoin blockchain. A 
remedy to this could be determining the respective responsibilities already in the design phase 
of the blockchain. Then it would be possible to classify nodes as joint controllers pursuant 
Article 26. Some authors believe considering the liability side of data protection in the design 
phase would lead to a huge downfall for the adaptation of blockchain-networks and hamper 
the innovative potential of decentralization behind blockchain technology.
173
 
 
Further it would be possible to argue that software developers are controllers as they are the 
ones who write the code of the blockchain. For example in the Bitcoin blockchain the 
programmer
174
 would be Satoshi Nakomoto, fulfilling the personhood criterion. It can be 
argued that by writing the code, the developer determines how the blockchain should operate. 
However, as the software is open source, it is produced collaboratively, shared freely, 
published transparently, and developed to be a community good rather than the property or 
business of a single company or person.
175
 Furthermore, it is developed by a developed and 
maintained by changing groups of volunteers, who in many cases are not directly 
compensated for their efforts and are in essence simply creating a useful tool, not prescribing 
how this tool should be used.
176
 Thus after the publication of the program code, the software 
developer relinquishes control over the means and purposes of the processing.
177
 Similar to 
other programmers, blockchain developers only supply a means for the processing of personal 
data, even though occasionally they play an important role in the further technical 
advancement of the blockchain.
178
 An example of this would be the DAO hack on the 
Etherum blockchain.
179
 However, solving technical problems is not considered as a 
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determination of the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.
180
 Therefore as 
the programmers do not determine the purposes and means of the processing, which is an 
important element of the controllership, they cannot be considered controllers as per Article 
4(7). 
 
In conclusion, it is not clear whether individual nodes or nodes collectively should be 
considered controllers. Each individual node does not determine the purposes and means of 
processing, therefore does not qualify as controller pursuant to Article 4(7). If over 51% of 
the nodes would reach consensus and alter the blocks on the chain, they would at least 
determine the means of processing. If the nodes would jointly determine the purposes and 
means of processing in a mutual arrangement, they would qualify as joint controllers pursuant 
to Article 26. However, in public permissionless blockchains, such as Bitcoin, there is no 
coordination between the nodes. Finally, software developers should not be considered 
controllers as they relinquish control of the open source software once it is published, thus 
they have no effective control on the purposes and means of processing.  
 
3.2. Territorial scope 
 
The territorial scope of the GDPR is laid down in Article 3. Article 3 defines the territorial 
scope on the basis of two main criteria: (1) the “establishment” criterion, as per Article 3(1), 
and the “targeting” criterion as per Article 3(2).181 In addition, as per Article 3(3) the GDPR 
applies where a controller is not established in the Union, but Member State law applies by 
virtue of public international law. Similarly as in section 2.1 this section will look at the 
guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR published by the EDPB, as well as 
European case law and apply these criterions to blockchain. As the third criterion applies to 
diplomatic mission or consular post cases
182
, the first two are most relevant to blockchain 
technology.  
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3.2.1. ‘Establishment’ criterion  
 
As per Article 3(1) the GDPR applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the 
activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether 
the processing takes place in the Union or not. The EDPB establishes a threefold approach in 
determining whether the processing of personal data falls within the scope of Article 3(1). 
 
The first element is “an establishment in the Union”. In order to define the establishment 
criterion, it is important to identify who is the controller or processor for a given processing 
activity.
183
 As seen in chapter 3.1 defining the controller in decentralised systems is more 
straightforward when private blockchains are used but more complex in public blockchains. 
 
The GDPR Article 4(16)(a) defines “main establishment” as regards a controller with 
establishments in more than one Member State, the place of its central administration in the 
Union, unless the decisions on the purposes and means of the processing of personal data are 
taken in another establishment of the controller in the Union and the latter establishment has 
the power to have such decisions implemented, in which case the establishment having taken 
such decisions is to be considered to be the main establishment. 
 
Recital 22 further clarifies that establishment “implies the effective and real exercise of 
activity through stable arrangements. The legal form of such arrangements, whether through a 
branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in that respect”. 
Furthermore Recital 36 states that “the main establishment of a controller in the Union should 
be the place of its central administration in the Union, unless the decisions on the purposes 
and means of the processing of personal data are taken in another establishment of the 
controller in the Union, in which case that other establishment should be considered to be the 
main establishment”. The main establishment should be determined according to objective 
criteria irrespective of location and imply the effective and real exercise of management 
activities determining the main decisions as to the purposes and means of processing through 
stable arrangements.
184
 
 
In several rulings the CJEU has broadened the term “establishment”, departing from a 
formalistic approach whereby undertakings are established solely in the place where they are 
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registered.
185
 In order to establish whether a company has an establishment in a Member State 
other than the Member State or third country where it is registered, both the degree of stability 
of the arrangements and the effective exercise of activities in that other Member State must be 
interpreted in the light of the specific nature of the economic activities and the provision of 
services concerned. 
186
 This is particularly true for undertakings offering services exclusively 
over the Internet.
187
 The 29WP notes the threshold for “stable arrangement” in the context of 
services online provided by non-EU entity’s can be as low as a single employee if the 
employee acts with a sufficient degree of stability.
188
 The nationality of the persons concerned 
by such data processing is irrelevant.
189
 The legal form of the establishment, whether simply a 
branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor.
190
 
 
The second consideration is “processing in the context of the activities of an establishment in 
the Union”. Article 3(1) confirms that is not necessary that the processing is carried out “by” 
the establishment concerned itself, but only that it be carried out “in the context of the 
activities” of the establishment.191 The EDPB recommends determining this consideration on 
a case-by-case basis, in the light of relevant case law.
192
 The CJEU has noted that “[to ensure] 
effective and complete protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, 
and in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data, [this 
criterion] cannot be interpreted restrictively”193. However, on the other hand it should not be 
concluded that the existence of any presence in the EU would trigger compliance.
194
 Two 
factors should be looked at when assessing this consideration. First, the relationship between 
the data controller or processor outside the Union and a local establishment in the Union – if 
the data processing activities are inextricably linked, the data protection may be triggered, 
even if that local establishment is not actually taking any role in the data processing itself.
195
 
Second, whether revenue raising is present in the Union by the local establishment to the 
extent that these activities can be considered “inextricably linked” to the processing of 
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personal data taking place outside the Union.
196
 For example, a foreign operator with a sales 
office or some other presence in the EU, even if that office has no role in the actual data 
processing, such as a Chinese owned e-commerce website with an office in Berlin to lead 
marketing campaigns towards the EU.
197
 
 
Finally the GDPR applies to processing in the context of the activities in the Union 
“regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not”. More specifically this 
means the place of processing is not relevant in determining whether or not the processing, 
carried out in the context of the activities of an EU establishment, fall into the scope of the 
GDPR.
198
 For example in an instance where a French car-sharing company addressed to 
customers of Tunisia and Morocco exclusively but with the processing being carried out in 
France, would trigger the compliance of the GDPR.
199
 
 
In the Google Spain case the intention of Google Spain, Google Inc.’s establishment in the 
EU, to promote and sell advertising space in a Member State, which served to make the 
service offered by [the controller] profitable was considered processing in the context of the 
activities of that establishment.
200
 The CJEU found that the activities of Google Inc. and 
Google Spain were inextricably linked since the activities relating to the advertising space 
constituted the means of rendering the controller economically profitable and that engine is, at 
the same time, the means enabling those activities to be performed.
201
 
 
3.2.2. ‘Targeting’ criterion  
 
As per Article 3(2) the GDPR also applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects 
who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the 
processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of 
whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) 
the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union. The 
EDPB recommends a twofold approach when analysing the ‘targeting’ criterion. First, 
whether the processing relates to subjects in the Union, and second whether it relates to the 
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offering of goods and services or to the monitoring of data subjects’ behaviour in the 
Union.
202
 The two conditions must be present together in order for the processing to qualify 
under Article 3(2). 
 
Article 3(2) applies to “data subjects in the Union” irrespective of their citizenship, residence 
or other type of legal status.
203
 This fact is also confirmed by Recital 14 which states 
“protection afforded by this Regulation should apply to natural persons, whatever their 
nationality or place of residence”. The requirement for the data subject to be located in the 
Union must be assessed when the triggering activity takes place, i.e. the at the moment of 
offering of goods or services or the moment the behaviour is being monitored, regardless of 
the duration of the offer made or monitoring undertaken.
204
 
 
The first alternative of the second condition of Article 3(2) is the “offering of goods and 
services”. It should be noted that the criterion applies irrespective of whether a payment has 
been made for said goods and services. A controller or processor is offering goods or services 
to data subjects who are in the Union if it is apparent that the controller or processor 
envisages offering services to data subjects in one or more Member States in the Union.
205
 
Whereas the mere accessibility of the controller's, processor's or an intermediary's website in 
the Union, of an email address or of other contact details, or the use of a language generally 
used in the third country where the controller is established, is insufficient to ascertain such 
intention, factors such as the use of a language or a currency generally used in one or more 
Member States with the possibility of ordering goods and services in that other language, or 
the mentioning of customers or users who are in the Union, may make it apparent that the 
controller envisages offering goods or services to data subjects in the Union.
206
 Therefore 
conditions, such as a processor’s website in the Union, cannot exist in isolation and trigger 
Article 3(2). Rather it should be ascertained whether the combination of factors show that the 
controller envisages offering goods or services to data subjects in the Union.  
 
Envisages offering goods or services – this approach has already triggered criticism, mainly 
revolving around the fact that targeting focuses on the subjective intentions of the controller 
and therefore compromise legal certainty. Instead, exclusive reliance on objective criteria, 
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such as the concrete outcome of businesses’ activities directed to the EU territory, is preferred 
for the determination of the territorial scope of the GDPR.
207
 
 
The second alternative is the “monitoring the data subjects behaviour”. In order to determine 
whether a processing activity can be considered to monitor the behaviour of data subjects, it 
should be ascertained whether natural persons are tracked on the internet including potential 
subsequent use of personal data processing techniques which consist of profiling a natural 
person, particularly in order to take decisions concerning her or him or for analysing or 
predicting her or his personal preferences, behaviours and attitudes.
208
 While Recital 24 
makes reference of tracking through the Internet, the EDPB considers that tracking through 
other types of network technology involving personal data processing, such as wearable or 
smart devices, should also be taken into account.
209
  
 
Although Article 3(2) does not mention the intention of the controller as part of this criterion, 
the EDPB notes the purpose of the processing needs to be still taken into account.
210
 
Examples of monitoring of activities include behavioural advertisement or studies, geo-
location activities, online tacking through cookies or fingerprinting, personalized diet and 
health analytic services online and CCTV.
211
 
 
3.2.3. Territorial scope of a blockchain 
 
Determining the territorial scope depends largely on determining the controller and 
subsequently establishing the applicable jurisdiction. In addition, the EPDB has stressed the 
importance of identifying the controller or processor of a given processing activity.
212
 The 
fact that blockchains operate on a decentralised structure means personal data could be 
processed across multiple jurisdictions. This in turn poses a risk to the protection of personal 
data of the subjects. Given that recital 13 of the GDPR stresses how technology should further 
facilitate the free flow of personal data within the Union and the transfer to third countries and 
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international organisations, while ensuring a high level of the protection of personal data,
213
 
blockchains could be problematic.  
 
An example of a private blockchain would be the Guardtime blockchain. Given that 
Guardtime’s headquarters are situated in Amsterdam, the Netherlands214 and one example of 
Guardtime’s blockchain solutions are government e-services run on blockchain techology, 
such as in Estonia and the Netherlands
215
, the Guardtime blockchain falls under Article 3(1).  
 
A public permissionless blockchain is public by definition, meaning anyone in any 
jurisdiction can download the software and run it on their computer. In addition, in a public 
permissionless blockchain the question of controllership is more nuanced. This in turn raises 
considerable questions as to how to determine the territorial scope of the GDPR.  
 
If every individual node would be considered a controller, then a node running the blockchain 
in Germany would fall under Article 3(1) as the processing of personal data in the context of 
the activities of an establishment in the Union. However, as the author already established, an 
individual node cannot be considered the controller, as it does not determine the purpose and 
means of processing pursuant Article 4(7).  
 
In the case of a public permissionless blockchain it would be possible to classify the nodes as 
joint controllers if they jointly determine the purposes and means of processing. In such case 
if the nodes are in the European Union, then the processing of personal data on a blockchain 
falls under Article 3(1). However, if one or more of the nodes is not established in the Union, 
it should be assayed whether such processing falls under Article 3(2). More specifically, first 
whether the processing relates to subjects in the Union, and second whether it relates to the 
offering of goods and services or to the monitoring of data subjects’ behaviour in the 
Union.
216
 The two conditions must be present together in order for the processing to qualify 
under Article 3(2). 
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The webpage www.Bitcoin.org is offered in several European Union languages, such as 
among others German, French, Italian, Dutch and Spanish.
217
 According to the EDPB one of 
the factors of the intention to offer goods or services can be the use of language or a currency 
other than generally used in the trader’s country, especially a language or currency of one or 
more EU member states.
218
 Although the language criterion is not determining in isolation, 
based on the use of multiple European languages, it can be concluded that the processing 
applies to data subjects in the Union. Bitcoin is described as “an innovative payment 
network”. 219  Thus the Bitcoin blockchain provides a platform for the trading of 
cryptocurrency. Therefore offering a platform for the trading of cryptocurrency in several 
member states constitues offering of good and services as per Article 3(2). Even if the joint 
controllers are not established in the European Union, the processing of personal data falls 
under Article 3(2) thus fulfilling the territorial scope of the GDPR and triggering compliance. 
 
Finck outlines that unpermissioned blockchain run on nodes located in various jurisdictions 
across the globe, leaving creators with no control over the geographic spread of the network, 
which makes DLTs inherently transnational in nature, triggering a range of jurisdictional 
issues.
220
 However, several authors have concluded that the broad territorial scope will apply 
to DLTs like blockchain.
221
 Moerel argues that similarly to the internet due to the lack of 
government regulated supervision, the stakeholders involved in blockchain will implement 
their own contractual self-regulatory mechanisms to ensure adequate dispute resolution.
222
 
This shall provide relief to the jurisdictional issues. Similarly as with the question of 
controllership, Moerel’s argument is oriented towards the future, while the present analysis 
focuses on the technology available today. Either way, as the present analysis demonstrated 
the territorial scope of the GDPR is broad and even data processing on decentralised systems 
will trigger compliance.  
 
3.2.4. Transfers of personal data to third countries or international organisations 
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Closely connected to the question of territorial scope are the transfers of personal data to third 
countries or international organisations. The transfer of personal data is permitted to the 28 
Member States of the European Union and to the European Economic Area member countries 
(Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein). The rest of the foreign countries are often referred to as 
"third countries". It is permitted to transfer personal data to a third country, if its level of data 
protection is deemed to be sufficient by the European Commission.
223
 
 
The GDPR encourages transfers of personal data to third countries or internal organisations, 
as they are necessary for the expansion of international trade and international cooperation. 
But in case of such transfers the level of protection of natural persons ensured in the Union by 
this Regulation should not be undermined and transfers to third countries and international 
organisations may only be carried out in full compliance with the GDPR.
 224
 
 
Chapter V of the GDPR establishes rules regarding the transfers of personal data to third 
countries or international organisations. According to Article 44 data transfer to a country or 
organisation outside the Union shall take place only if the controller and processor comply 
with the conditions in chapter V of the GDPR. Moreover, according to Article 44 all 
provisions in chapter V of the GDPR shall be applied in order to ensure that the level of 
protection of natural persons guaranteed by the GDPR is not undermined. Such transfers are 
allowed based on an adequacy decision
225
, appropriate safeguards
226
 or specific 
derogations.
227
 Chapter V suggests that this is not a list but rather a hierarchy with adequacy 
decisions at the top and derogations at the bottom.
228
  
 
So far the European Commission has issued adequacy decisions to Andorra
229
, Argentina
230
, 
Canada
231
, Faroe Islands
232
, Guernsey
233
, Israel
234
, Isle of Man
235
, Japan
236
, Jersey
237
, New 
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Zealand
238
, Switzerland
239
, Uruguay
240
 and the United States (limited to the Privacy Shield 
framework).
241
 Previously personal data transfers to the United States were considered 
adequate under the Safe Harbour decision
242
, which was invalidated in the Maximillian 
Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner case.
243
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Similarly as observed in chapter 3.2.3 decentralised systems such as blockchain are 
problematic from the perspective of data protection because anyone can download the 
blockchain from different parts of the world. Subsequently personal data can be shared to any 
location. In such a scenario the rules set forth in chapter V of the GDPR should be complied 
with but are more difficult to enforce in the case of DLTs. 
 
Finck opines that in theory the chain’s protocol could be designed to account for these 
accounts, yet the substantive requirements of data protection cannot easily be reconciled with 
DLT. A more realistic solution is enshrined in Article 49(1)(1) that foresees the possibility of 
a data subject providing explicit consent for such a transfer, subject to being informed about 
possible risk. Adding also that this could be achieved on a private blockchain, but it is not 
obvious how such consent should be acquired in respect of a permissionless chain.
 244
 
Informed consent is particularly decisive in the context of transfers of personal data to third 
countries.
245
 The relevance of consent pursuant to Article 49(1)(1)(a) depends on whether to 
consider using the blockchain as giving de facto consent to the processing of personal data. 
The author would refrain from reaching such a conclusion.  
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4. Data protection requirements and core characteristics of 
blockchain  
 
4.1. Principles 
 
The principles relating to processing of personal data set out the basic rules that apply to the 
processing of personal data – they provide foundations for European data protection law.246 
The principles relating to processing of personal data are laid down in Article 5(1). Pursuant 
to Article 5(2) the controller shall be able to demonstrate compliance with the principles set 
out in Article 5(1). 
 
The most relevant principles in relation to blockchain technology are the data minimisation 
principle pursuant to Article 5(1)(c), storage limitation principle pursuant Article 5(1)(e) and 
the data protection by design and default principle pursuant to Article 25. 
4.1.1. Data minimisation and privacy by design and default 
 
Data minimisation is defined in Article 5(1)(c), which states “personal data shall be adequate, 
relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are 
processed”. The principle of data minimisation must be read in conjunction with the 
obligations of data protection by design and default set out in Article 25.
247
 
 
Data minimisation was considered in Google Spain where the CJEU noted “even initially 
lawful processing of accurate data may, in the course of time, become incompatible with the 
directive where those data are no longer necessary in the light of the purposes for which they 
were collected or processed. That is so in particular where they appear to be inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those purposes and in the light of 
the time that has elapsed”.248 As 12 years had passed since the publication of the newspaper 
mentioning the complainant’s name, the CJEU ruled that the operator of the search engine – 
Google - must erase said links to Mr González’s name. 249 
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Article 25 contains the data protection by design and default obligation. Article 25(1) states 
that “taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation and the nature, scope, 
context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for 
rights and freedoms of natural persons posed by the processing, the controller shall, both at 
the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the processing 
itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as 
pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data 
minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the 
processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data 
subjects”.  
 
Thus controllers must account for the GDPR’s objectives already in the design phase. To 
demonstrate compliance the controller should adopt internal policies and implement 
measures, which meet in particular the principles of data protection by design and data 
protection by default. 
250
 Such measures include minimising the processing of personal data, 
pseudonymising personal data as soon as possible, transparency with regard to the functions 
and processing of personal data, enabling the data subject to monitor the data processing, 
enabling the controller to create and improve security features.
251
 
4.1.2. Storage limitation 
 
The storage limitation principle is defined in Article 5(1)(e). Personal data must be “kept in a 
form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the 
purposes for which the personal data are processed”.252 This requires, in particular, ensuring 
that the period for which the personal data are stored is limited to a strict minimum.
253
 
Personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data will be processed 
solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or 
statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) subject to implementation of the 
appropriate technical and organisational measures required by [the GDPR] in order to 
safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject.
254
 In order to ensure that the personal 
                                                        
250
 Recital 78 GDPR 
251
 Ibid. 
252
 Article 5(1)(e) 
253
 Recital 39 GDPR 
254
 Article 5(1)(c) GDPR 
 44 
data are not kept longer than necessary time limits should be established by the controller for 
erasure or for periodic review.
255
  
 
The CJEU considered storage limitation principle in the Nowak case ruling that the retention 
of the written answers submitted by a candidate and the examiner’s comments “is, a priori, no 
longer necessary as soon as the examination procedure is finally closed and can no longer be 
challenged, so that those answers and comments have lost any probative value”. 256 
Conversely to the Nowak case in Camera di Commercio,Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura 
di Lecce v Salvatore Manni 
257
the CJEU stated “it seems impossible, at present, to identify a 
single time limit, as from the dissolution of a company, at the end of which the inclusion of 
such data in the register and their disclosure would no longer be necessary”.258  
4.1.3. Principles and blockchain 
 
Although the GDPR should be a technology neutral law, it can be argued that the core 
characteristics of the blockchain technology are in tension with the minimisation principle 
pursuant to Article 5(1)(c), storage limitation principle pursuant Article 5(1)(e) and the data 
protection by design and default principle pursuant to Article 25. 
 
Firstly, as each node has their own copy of the blockchain stored on their computer on the 
network [and the computers periodically synchronize through the P2P network,] the nodes are 
in charge of carrying out transactions and thus distributing the information to all other 
nodes.
259
 Therefore the data is replicated in every node – replicated in each computer running 
the blockchain software. This in turn is difficult to reconcile with the data minimisation 
principle, which entails keeping personal data limited to what is necessary in relation to the 
purposes for which they are processed.
260
  
 
Michele Finck considers the data minimisation principle to be profoundly at odds with data 
storage on a DLT as distributed ledgers are by definition ever-growing creatures, which 
augment and accumulate further data with each additional block. In addition, integral copies 
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of the chain are stored on each full node, contradicting the data minimisation.
261
 Shraddha 
Kulhari notes that digital identity platforms built on blockchain would fall foul of the 
traditional understanding of the data minimisation principle and such contradiction would 
arise from the structure of the blockchain technology whereby data is replicated on each 
node.
262
 
 
Secondly, Article 25 requires for the controller to implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-
protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the 
necessary safeguards into the processing. Encryption is one of the measures, which the 
controller should adopt to comply with the principles of data protection by design and data 
protection by default.
263
 As data on blockchain is encrypted, it can be argued that at least one 
element towards compliance is accounted for. Furthermore, as data on the blockchain is 
immutable, a case could be made for the security of the data - said data is tamper-resistant and 
every change is traceable. However, as the replication of data is counter to data minimisation 
principle, a case could be made that the principle data protection by design and default has not 
been accounted for in the developing stage of the technology. Such a conclusion could have 
implications on the compliance of controller using blockchain.  
 
Matthias Berberich and Malgorzata Steiner opine that the fact that the current architecture of 
blockchain runs counter to data minimisation, storage limitations and clearly determined data 
controller, may raise the question whether it is in line with the privacy by design principle. 
Berberich and Steiner find it doubtful that the aforementioned features of blockchain are 
incompatible with Article 25, as views diverge whether Article 25 generally brings additional 
“hard obligations”. Furthermore, Article 25 does not set out absolute requirements – 
implementing the principle will take account of state-of-the-art technology, implementation 
costs, nature, scope, context and purposes of data processing as well as the likelihood of 
privacy risks. It does not strictly rule out that a balance may be struck between legitimate 
policy objectives.
 264
 Adding that it would also make a difference in respect to Article 25 
whether public or private blockchains are used, as well as implementing additional 
technology, such as adding noise to blockchains to prevent re-identification.
265
 Such a 
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conclusion makes sense, as the elements of data protection are more clear-cut in private 
blockchains, while public permissionless blockchains remain challenging for regulators.  
 
Furthermore, Michele Finck expresses the view that while data minimisation will always be 
challenging on DLTs, Article 25(1) underlines that encryption can be a desirable feature, 
which may be reason for regulators and CJEUs to look favourably at the technology.
266
 Finck 
concludes however, that Article 25 cannot be complied with in respect to public keys as each 
full node holds a complete copy of each blockchain and given that a new block is added to the 
complete preceding chain. The only way to ensure compliance in this respect would be to 
recognize specific key-handling techniques such as particularly strong encryption formulas or 
zero-knowledge proof as GDPR compliant.
267
  
 
Thirdly, after a block has been added to the blockchain, it can no longer be deleted and the 
transactions it contains can be accessed and verified by everyone on the network.
268
 Unless 
the nodes engage in a “51% attack” to alter the chain, the data on the chain is immutable. This 
raises the question of how the immutability should be reconciled with the storage limitation 
principle pursuant Article 5(1)(e)? As the period for which the personal is stored should be 
limited to a strict minimum and the controller should establish time limits for erasure or 
periodic review
269
, the question of compliance arises when on blockchain data is stored 
indefinitely.  
 
Considering that the controller shall be responsible for, and must be able to demonstrate 
compliance with the core principles as per Article 5(2), the tension with the core principles of 
the GDPR might result in noncompliance of all actors using blockchain technologies and the 
subsequent heavy fines of the GDPR. A similar problem has been observed in relation to Big 
Data.
270
 
 
                                                        
266
 M. Finck. p. 32. 
267
 Ibid. 
268
 P. De Filippi, A. Wright. Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex 
Cryptographia. p 8 
269
 Recital 39 GDPR  
270
 See for example: T. Zasky. Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data - 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3022646 (30.03.2019); B-J. Koops. 
Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the 'Right to Be Forgotten' 
in Big Data Practice - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1986719 
(16.04.2019) 
 47 
However, there are several methods to overcome the tension with the core principles of the 
GDPR. One solution would be storing data off-chain and merely linked to the blockchain 
through a hash pointer.
271
 The MIT-ENIGMA project combines off-chain and on-chain 
storage for more sensible data using the blockchain only as a “pointer” to centrally stored 
data.
272
 Another solution is the zero knowledge proof, a technique by which an entity, or 
prover, with private data provides a verifiable proof to a verifier that certain property holds 
true for that data without revealing any additional information other than the truth of verified 
property.
273
 Off-chain storage solution could however, require the reintroduction of a trusted 
third party
274
, which would undermine the decentralization of a blockchain. In any case the 
author believes that it is possible to overcome the tension with principles through 
technological development.  
4.2. Lawfulness of processing 
4.2.1. General grounds 
 
In order for processing to be lawful, personal data should be processed on the basis of the 
consent of the data subject concerned or some other legitimate basis, laid down by law.
275
 In 
addition, one of the main principles of the GDPR is that personal data should be processed 
lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject.
276
 
 
The grounds for processing are laid down in Article 6(1) of the GDPR, which provides that 
processing is lawful if at least one of the following applies:  
 
1) processing is based on consent; 
2) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract; 
3) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation; 
4) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of 
another natural person; 
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5) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest 
or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; 
6) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by a third party.
277
 
 
The author considers processing based on consent in relation to the public permissionless 
blockchain and processing necessary for the compliance with a legal obligation in relation to 
KSI blockchain. Therefore for the purposes of the present thesis only these grounds will be 
analysed. 
4.2.2. Conditions for consent 
 
The definition of consent is found in Article 4(11) which states that consent of the data 
subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data 
subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies 
agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her. The 29WP has noted that 
the order in which the legal grounds in Article 7 is relevant, but it does not mean consent is 
always the most appropriate ground to legitimize the processing of personal data.
278
 If consent 
is not used in the right context, it provides a weak legal basis for processing.
279
 Therefore the 
elements of consent are (1) it is given freely, (2) it is specific, (3) informed, (4) unambiguous 
and (5) explicit. 
 
The first element is freely given. This element implies real choice and control for data 
subjects.
280
 Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine 
or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment.
281
 Consent can be 
valid is the data subject is able to exercise a real choice, and there is no risk of deception, 
intimidation, coercion or significant negative consequences if he or she does not consent.
282
 In 
a case of clear imbalance between a data subject and controller, like when the controller is a 
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public authority, consent should not provide a legal ground for processing.
283
 Any element of 
inappropriate pressure or influence upon the data subject shall render the consent invalid.
284
 
 
The second element is the consent must be specific. This means that blanket consent without 
specifying the exact purpose of the processing is not acceptable. To be specific, the consent 
must be intelligible: it should refer clearly and precisely to the scope and the consequences of 
the data processing.
285
 To comply the controller must apply purpose specifications as a 
safeguard against function creep, granularity in consent requests and clear separation of 
information related to obtaining consent for data processing activities from information about 
other matters.
286
 
 
The third element is the informed character of the consent. For consent to be informed, the 
data subject should be aware at least of the identity of the controller and the purposes of the 
processing for which the personal data are intended.
287
 At least the following information is 
required for obtaining a valid consent:  
1. the identity of the controller; 
2. the purpose of each processing of operations for which consent is sought; 
3. what type of data will be collected and used; 
4. the existence of the right to withdraw consent; 
5. information about the use of data for automated decision-making in accordance with 
Article 22(2)(c); 
6. on the possible risks of data transfers due to absence of an adequacy decision and of 
appropriate safeguards as described in Article 46.
288
 
 
The information provided must be sufficient to guarantee that individuals can make well-
informed decisions about the processing of their personal data. This translates into giving 
information in appropriate language for the subject to understand and providing the 
information in a clear and sufficiently conspicuous manner so that users cannot overlook it.
289
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The fourth element is that consent must be unambiguous meaning that the procedure to seek 
and give consent must leave no doubt as to the data subject’s intention to deliver consent. 
Data controllers are de facto encouraged to have in place procedures and mechanisms to leave 
no doubt that consent has been given, either on the basis of an express action carried out by 
the individual or by being clearly inferred from an action carried out by an individual. 
290
 
 
Finally, the consent must be explicit or an indication of the wish of the subject by a statement 
of clear, affirmative action. This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet 
website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or 
conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject's acceptance of the proposed 
processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not 
therefore constitute consent.
291
 
 
Furthermore, conditions for consent are laid down in Article 7 and as per Article 7(1) the 
controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to processing of his 
or her personal data where processing is based on consent. Pursuant to Article 7(3) the data 
subject has the right to withdraw consent at any time. This distinguishes processing based on 
consent from other lawful bases.
292
  
 
4.2.3. Consent as a lawful basis of processing on public permissionless blockchain 
 
Given that in order to use the public blockchain, a person – the node – has to download the 
blockchain and run the software on their computer, one possible interpretation could be that 
by doing so the data subject consents to the processing of personal data and thus the legal 
basis for processing is Article 6(1)(a). However, the as outline in chapter 4.2.2 the GDPR sets 
very specific conditions for consent. Thus the conditions need to be analysed separately. 
 
In the case of a public permissionless blockchain it is the user’s choice to download the full 
node on their computer, run it and therefore participate in the blockchain network. Therefore 
the question whether consent is given freely should be answered in the affirmative. 
Furthermore, downloading the blockchain and running it on the computer constitutes an 
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affirmative action. However, “a clear affirmative act” means that the data subject must have 
taken a deliberate action to consent to the particular processing.
293
  
 
More problematic are the elements of being informed and specific. Firstly, in order for the 
consent to be informed, the data subject should at least be aware of the identity of the 
controller and the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended.
294
 This 
is problematic in a public permissionless setting as the question of controllership is not so 
clear. WP29 notes that in a case where the consent sought is to be relied upon by multiple 
(joint) controllers or if the data is to be transferred or processed by other controllers, who 
wish to rely on the original consent, these organisations should all be named.
295
 If one would 
follow the argumentation that all the nodes on the network constitute joint controllers 
pursuant Article 26, this would be again problematic.  
 
Furthermore, the GDPR does not prescribe the form or shape in which information should be 
provided in order to fulfil the requirements of informed consent. However, the GDPR puts 
several requirements for informed consent in place, predominantly in Article 7(2) and Recital 
32, which leads to a higher standard for the clarity and accessibility of the information.
296
 
 
Secondly, for the consent to be specific, obtaining valid consent is always preceded by the 
determination of a specific, explicit and legitimate purpose of the intended processing activity 
pursuant to Article 5(1)(b) GDPR.
297
 Again it is in a public permissionless setting it is not 
clear as to what the specific the consent is given. The controller is expected to separate clearly 
information related to obtaining consent for data processing activities from information about 
other matters.
298
 
 
In can be concluded that not every criterion of the conditions for consent is met. Similarly, the 
European Commission’s EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum, comprised of specialists in 
the field, in their report have noted that it could be argued that by choosing to use a 
decentralised network, like Bitcoin, the user is de facto providing consent. GDPR however, 
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stipulates that consent be specific and unambiguous, which seems to imply active granting of 
permission, not a passive one.
299
  
 
In addition, a separate and additional consent should be requested to allow for the sending of 
the individual’s data to third parties300 and that informed consent is particularly decisive in the 
context of transfers of personal data to third countries.
301
 These criterions are difficult to 
enforce in a decentralised structure. Blockchains as technology however, are good 
mechanisms for giving and withdrawing consent if the law is used as a base requirement.
302
  
 
4.2.4. Legal obligation as a lawful basis of processing on private blockchain 
 
The controller of data on the e-Health platform is the Ministry of Social Affairs and the 
processor is Health and Welfare Information Systems Centre.
303
 Where processing is carried 
out in accordance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject or where 
processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the 
exercise of official authority, the processing should have a basis in Union or Member State 
law.
304
 The legal basis for the processing of personal data comes from the Health Services 
Organisation Act
305
 Thus the legal basis for processing is Article 6(1)(c). 
 
In addition, as discussed in chapter 2.1 special data pursuant Article 9(1) merits special 
protection in the European data protection regime as the processing of such data could create 
significant risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.
306
 The GDPR sets 
a general prohibition of the processing of special data.
307
 The processing of special data is 
only allowed when the conditions in Article 9(2) are met.
308
 In addition to specific 
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requirements of the processing of special categories of personal data, the general principles of 
the GDPR should apply, in particular as regards to the conditions for lawful processing.
309
 A 
margin of manoeuvre is left to Member States to specify the rules concerning the processing 
of special categories of personal data.
310
 
 
Guardtime’s KSI blockchain contains personal data concerning health pursuant to Article 
9(1). The processing of such special data is prohibited unless the exceptions in Article 9(2) 
apply. The applicable exception could be Article 9(2)(h) which states that processing is 
necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the 
working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or 
treatment or the management of health or social care systems and services on the basis of 
Union or Member State law or pursuant to contract with a health professional and subject to 
the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 3.  
 
According to Recital 52 the derogation from “the general prohibition may be made for health 
purposes, including […] the management of health-care services, especially in order to ensure 
the quality and cost-effectiveness of the procedures used for settling claims for benefits and 
services in the health insurance system”.311 Furthermore, special categories of personal data 
which merit higher protection should be processed for health-related purposes only where 
necessary to achieve those purposes for the benefit of natural persons and society as a whole, 
in particular in the context of the management of health or social care services and systems, 
including processing by the management and central national health authorities of such data 
for the purpose of quality control, management information and the general national and local 
supervision of the health or social care system, and ensuring continuity of health or social care 
and cross-border healthcare or health security.
312
 The KSI blockchain is used in Estonia’s e-
Health platform thus it is used for the management of health or social care systems and 
services on the basis of Union or Member State law. Furthermore, the blockchain is used to 
process personal data by the national health authority for the management of information. 
Therefore the exception of Article 9(2)(h) is applicable in the case of Guartime’s blockchain. 
The Bitcoin blockchain as a rule does not process special data, more specifically data 
concerning health. However, if it did, then the abovementioned exception would not be 
applicable. 
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4.3. Rights of the data subject and data persistence 
4.3.1. Right to rectification 
 
The right to rectification is contained in Article 16. Pursuant to Article 16 the data subject 
first has the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of 
inaccurate personal data concerning him or her. Second, taking into account the purposes of 
the processing, the data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data 
completed, including by means of providing a supplementary statement.  
 
Every reasonable step must be taken by the controller to ensure that data, which does not meet 
the requirements of Article 16, is erased or rectified.
313
 In the Schrems case the CJEU noted 
that the data subjects had no administrative or judicial means of redress enabling, in 
particular, the data relating to them to be accessed and, as the case may be, rectified or 
erased.
314
 Therefore outlining the importance of such procedures.  
4.3.2. Right to erasure 
 
The right to erasure or the “Right to be forgotten” is laid down in Article 17(1) according to 
which the data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal 
data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to 
erase personal data without undue delay if one of the conditions of Article 17(1) applies. Said 
conditions include that data is no longer necessary, withdrawal of consent, objection pursuant 
Article 21, unlawful processing, a legal obligation to erase the personal data and the collection 
of personal data in relation to information society services referred to in Article 8(1).
315
 A 
data subject should have the right to have personal data concerning him or her rectified and a 
“right to be forgotten” where the retention of such data infringes this Regulation or Union or 
Member State law to which the controller is subject.
316
 
 
                                                        
313
 CJEU C‑ 131/12, para. 72. 
314
 CJEU C‑ 362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, para. 90. 
315
 Article 17(1)(a)-(f) GDPR 
316
 Recital 65 GDPR 
 55 
The right to erasure did not exist in the Directive 95/46/EC.
317
 The Directive 95/46/EC did 
however contain references to erasure of data.
318
  The intellectual roots of the “right to be 
forgotten” in Europe can be found in French law, which recognises le droit á l'oubli or the 
“right to oblivion” – a right that allows a convicted criminal who has served his time and been 
rehabilitated to object to the publication of the facts of his conviction and incarceration.
319
 
The introduction of said right in the GDPR constitutes an attempt of the EU to facilitate the 
erasure of obsolete personal data and thereby respond to the challenges posed by the digital 
remembering.
320
 The right has is the most controversial and has been discussed in literature
321
 
and also criticized as the biggest threat to free speech on the Internet in the coming decade.
322
 
Furthermore, the extent to which the right to be forgotten may be enforceable in practice 
remains unclear
323
 and whether any item of data can ever be fully or properly erased is very 
much open to question.
324
 However, further analysis on this topic would be out of the scope of 
this thesis.  
 
If a controller has made personal data public and is obliged to erase personal data pursuant to 
Article 17(1), the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of 
implementation, shall take reasonable steps, to inform controllers which are processing the 
personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links 
to, or copy or replication of, those personal data.
325
 Such measures are to be taken to 
“strengthen the right to be forgotten in the online environment”.326 
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The right to erasure in not an absolute right and shall not apply if processing is necessary for 
exercising the right of freedom of expression and information, for compliance with a legal 
obligation or for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise 
of official authority vested in the controller, for public interest in the area of public health, for 
archiving purposes in the public interest and the establishment, exercise or defence of legal 
claims.
327
 That right is relevant in particular where the data subject has given his or her 
consent as a child and is not fully aware of the risks involved by the processing, and later 
wants to remove such personal data, especially on the internet. The data subject should be 
able to exercise that right notwithstanding the fact that he or she is no longer a child.
328
 
 
Methods by which to restrict the processing of personal data could include, inter alia, 
temporarily moving the selected data to another processing system, making the selected 
personal data unavailable to users, or temporarily removing published data from a website.
329
 
In automated filing systems, the restriction of processing should in principle be ensured by 
technical means in such a manner that the personal data are not subject to further processing 
operations and cannot be changed. The fact that the processing of personal data is restricted 
should be clearly indicated in the system.
330
 
 
The right to be forgotten was considered by the CJEU in the Google Spain case. However, it 
should be noted that the CJEU found that the links to Mr. González’s name in the Google 
Search should be removed, even when its publication in itself on those pages is lawful
331
 as 
the processing by the publisher of a web page consisting in the publication of information 
relating to an individual may, in some circumstances, be carried out “solely for journalistic 
purposes” and thus fall under an exception, whereas that does not appear to be so in the case 
of the processing carried out by the operator of a search engine.
 332
 Thus the CJEU did not 
oblige the daily newspaper to remove the original content. The CJEU also held that the right 
to private life and protection of personal data should be balanced against economic interest of 
the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general public in finding that 
information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name. The CJEU found that in the 
present case Mr. González’s rights overrode the economic interests and public interests. 
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However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role 
played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is 
justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of inclusion 
in the list of results, access to the information in question.
333
 
4.3.3. Rights and blockchain 
 
Similarly to chapter 4.1 it can be argued that the core characteristic of blockchain technology 
– data immutability – is in tension with the right to rectification pursuant Article 16 and right 
to erasure pursuant Article 17.  
 
Firstly, pursuant to Article 16 the data subject has the right to obtain without undue delay the 
rectification of inaccurate personal data. Article 16 does not provide any exceptions to this 
right but the purposes of the processing should be taken into account. 
 
Secondly, as per Article 17(1) any data subject has right to obtain from the controller the 
erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay if one or several of the 
Article 17(1) conditions apply. That could be the case for example if a financial transaction 
has been carried out and the personal data is no longer necessary in relation to the purposes of 
which it was collected as per Article 17(1)(a), the data subject withdraws consent as per 
Article 17(1)(b) or the data subject objects to the processing as per Article 17(1)(c) and there 
are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing. Given that none of the exceptions 
apply, the controller of the blockchain would have to delete the personal data, which infringes 
the data subject’s rights from a block.  
 
As immutability is a core feature of the technology, both erasure and rectification would be 
practically impossible. As outlined above, changing a block would be possible if 51% of the 
nodes engaged in a “51% attack” which would require extensive computational power and 
financial resources. This would result in breaking the chain and altering a block. However, as 
the blockchain would be completely ‘blocked’ before it can even resume its function of 
adding new transactions, it appears at the moment almost unfeasible from an operational and 
technical perspective to change blockchain content subsequently in practical operation.
334
 
Therefore the controllers of blockchain technology could not comply with the requirements 
set forth in Article 16 and Article 17 due to the persistence of data on a blockchain. Still as set 
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forth in the case Google Spain the right to erasure is not an absolute right, it would have to be 
balanced with other rights. For example in line with the Manni ruling registering limited 
personal data in a blockchain for public registers like land ownership, trademark ownership, 
company registers, may well be justified.
335
 
 
Michele Finck notes that pursuant to Article 16 the data subject could address any or all nodes 
with a request to rectify personal data subject to the provided conditions. However, 
identification of all full nodes is problematic and data stored on them cannot be changed 
except in very exceptional circumstances.
336
 With regards to erasure, Finck opines whether 
the reference to “available technology” could lead to an interpretation of the GDPR that 
dispenses from outright erasure in light of blockchains’ technical limitations in favour of an 
alternative solution, such as transmitting a key to the data subject or deletion of the private 
key.
337
  
 
Other possible solutions include adding to the blockchain a transaction that contains a 
reference to the block that is being erased or amended that semantically invalidates it. 
However, the applicability of such a solution depends on the significance of erroneous data 
being still visible, even if the blockchain attests its amendment.
 
For example, if blockchain is 
used to store data about sexual offenders and due to a mistake, a record of someone that has 
not committed such a crime appears in the blockchain. This citizen invokes his right to 
amendment, and a transaction on the blockchain is pushed such that the record is 
“invalidated”. Would that be enough? 338 The author believes preference should be given to 
other solutions. Or perhaps soon a high enough level of anonymisation of personal data within 
blockchain systems is achieved, that the GDPR could be sidestepped from its very 
beginning.
339
 
 
From the perspective of erasure, another promising solution is the editable blockchain, which 
has been patented by Accenture. Accenture’s editable blockchain allows designated 
authorities to edit, rewrite or remove previous blocks of information without breaking the 
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chain under extraordinary circumstances using a “chameleon” hash.340 However, removing 
the immutability feature comes at a price – other measures should be implemented to retain 
(or gain) sufficient trust in the blockchain application for individuals and organisations to use 
it as a record of their transactions.
341
 
 
Shraddha Kulhari makes a point that the immutability of blockchains should be left intact and 
regulators should not adopt a very restrictive interpretation and rather strike a balance 
between protecting privacy and the understanding of how technology shapes up.
342
 The author 
agrees with this view, as with all emerging technologies a balance should be struck between 
regulation on one hand and innovation, on the other. An example of this is Article 35(1) of 
Germany’s Federal Data Protection Act, which states that the subject shall not have the right 
to erasure if erasure would be impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort due to the 
specific mode of storage.
343
  
 
Berberich and Malgorzata Steiner argue that under Article 17(1)(a) personal data could be 
still necessary for the processing purpose, as blockchain by design requires persistent and 
continuously written chain.
344
 It is doubtful whether such an interpretation is in line with the 
purpose limitation principle and thus with the objectives of the GDPR as a whole. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
As data protection of natural persons should be technologically neutral and should not depend 
on the techniques used, it was not clear how several provisions of the GDPR should be 
complied with in the context of blockchain technology. Thus the purpose of the present thesis 
was research whether blockchain and the GDPR can be reconciled as well as develop a 
comprehensive approach on the topic. The current master’s thesis aimed to answer three 
research questions.  
 
Firstly, whether the data processing on a blockchain falls within the material scope of the 
GDPR and thus whether the GDPR applies to blockchain? The first chapter was dedicated to 
answering this question. In order to understand the definition of personal data the author 
looked at guidelines of 29WP and the case law of CJEU. From this analysis it became 
apparent that the definition of personal data is broad, encompassing four main elements: (1) 
any information, (2) relating to, (3) identified or identifiable, (4) natural person. Two types of 
data are stored on a blockchain - the data, which is stored in blocks and the public key. The 
data stored on blocks is encrypted, while the public keys are hashed. Principles of data 
protection do not apply to anonymous information. However, both encryption and hashing are 
considered pseudonymisation techniques. Therefore as direct identification of the data subject 
is not possible, the author looked at whether the identification of data subjects would be 
possible with additional information. For example Bitcoin users disclose their addresses 
voluntarily when interacting with other participants, but can also be identified through 
mapping their Bitcoin addresses to IP addresses or by clustering the addresses. The standard 
for identification was set forth in the case of Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
according to which the identification is practically impossible on account of the fact that it 
requires a disproportionate effort in terms of time, cost and man-power. Applying the 
standard set forth in the case Breyer, it was concluded that data identification should be very 
likely and thus both data contained on blocks and the public keys should be considered 
personal data pursuant to Article 4(1).  
 
Furthermore, blockchain is a type of database where records are stored one after the other in a 
continuous ledger. Storing data on a blockchain constitutes processing pursuant to Article 
4(2) of the GRPR. Furthermore, processing personal data on a blockchain is carried out 
automatically, thus fulfilling the material scope if no exceptions apply. The most relevant of 
the exceptions in relation to blockchain was the “household exception” which was relevant in 
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relation to a public blockchain. No exceptions applied in the case of Guardtime’s private 
blockchain. However, it was concluded that the household exception pursuant to Article 2(2) 
does not apply as demonstrated by the Bodil Linqvist case because a public permissionless 
blockchain, such as Bitcoin, is available for anyone to download and therefore the data will be 
available to an indefinite number of people. Thus as none of the exceptions were applicable, 
the processing of personal data on a blockchain was within the material scope of the GDPR. 
 
The second chapter assessed decentralised data sharing on a blockchain. First determining the 
question of controllership on a blockchain as it is important in terms of allocating 
responsibility, as well as the material scope. As per Article 4(7) the three elements of the 
definition of controller were looked at: (1) natural or legal person, public authority, agency or 
other body, (2) alone or jointly with others and (3) determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data. Further the author analysed the elements of joint controllership 
pursuant to Article 26, which included multiple controllers jointly determining the purposes 
and means of processing with a transparent arrangement between each other.  
 
The author concluded that in case of a private blockchain it is possible to identify a controller 
(or several controllers in case of a consortium blockchain) – the controller is the natural or 
legal person who determines the purposes and means of processing. In a public permissionless 
blockchain there is no central point of control as the network is opetated by all nodes in a 
decentralised fashion. Thus allocating responsibility and thus identifying a controller can be 
more difficult. The debate about controllership in public blockchains is still on-going and has 
not been settled. One solution would be to consider natural or legal person behind each node 
(the user) to be the controller if they determine the purpose and means of processing. 
However, nodes do not decide on the means of processing as they have no effect on which 
data is processed, for how long and when will said data be deleted. If over 51% of the nodes 
would reach consensus and alter the blocks on the chain, they would at least determine the 
means of processing. 
 
The second solution would be to classify all the nodes collectively as joint controllers under 
article 26(1) if the nodes “jointly determine the purposes and means of processing”, as well as 
determine their respective responsibilities for compliance in a transparent manner by means of 
arrangement. If the criteria are fulfilled, joint controllership should be affirmed. However, in 
scenarios, such as Bitcoin the rules of the network stem not from an agreement of the nodes, 
but ultimately from the sum of their independent behaviour. Thus it is doubtful that the nodes 
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determine their respective responsibilities. Finally, software developers should not be 
considered controllers as they relinquish control of the open source software once it is 
published, thus they have no effective control on the purposes and means of processing.  
 
Next the territorial scope of the GDPR was assessed in relation to blockchain technology. The 
fact that blockchains operate on a decentralised structure means personal data could be 
processed across multiple jurisdictions. This in turn poses a risk to the protection of personal 
data of the subjects. The territorial scope of the GDPR as per Article 3 is comprised of two 
criteria. Firstly, the “establishment” criterion as per Article 3(1) meaning the GDPR applies to 
the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a 
controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the 
Union or not. Second, the “targeting” criterion as per Article 3(2) meaning the GDPR applies 
to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or 
processor not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to either the 
offering of goods or services or the monitoring of the subjects’ behaviour. 
 
It was concluded that in case of a private blockchain, which is established in the European 
Union, such as Guardtime, the processing falls within Article 3(1). In public blockchains 
anyone can download the software from anywhere in the world, meaning if the controller is 
not established in the European Union, the GDPR would apply if the conditions of Article 
3(2) were met. The author found that in the case of Bitcoin the webpage was offered in 
several European languages and provides a platform for the trading of cryptocurrency. 
Therefore the conditions of Article 3(2) were met. It was concluded that the territorial scope 
of the GDPR is broad and even data processing on decentralised systems will trigger 
compliance. In addition, as part of the territorial scope the problem of data transfers to third 
countries and international organisations was touched upon. The GDPR allows for such 
transfers only when specific conditions in chapter V of the GDPR are met but they more 
difficult to enforce in the case of DLTs. 
 
The final chapter compared data protection requirements and core characteristics of 
blockchain technology. First, a tension with the minimisation minimisation principle pursuant 
to Article 5(1)(c), storage limitation principle pursuant Article 5(1)(e) and the data protection 
by design and default principle pursuant to Article 25, was found. This is due to the ever-
growing nature of data on blockchains and data persistence due to the immutable nature of the 
technology. The author considered whether due to said core characteristics of blockchain the 
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technology was at odds with the core principles of the GDPR. However, blockchains personal 
data on blockchains is encrypted and encryption is one of the measures, which the controller 
should adopt to comply with the principles of data protection by design and data protection by 
default. The author outlined solutions such as off-chain storage and zero knowledge proofs, 
which could also be of help in overcoming this tension. 
 
Then the criterion for lawfulness of processing was looked at. The author considered consent 
to be the most plausible legal ground for processing in public permissionless blockchain 
setting. As in order to use the public blockchain, a person – the node – has to download the 
blockchain and run the software on their computer, this could be considered de facto 
consenting. Although downloading the blockchain and running it on the computer constitutes 
a freely given, affirmative action, the other necessary conditions for consent – such as being 
informed and specific – were not met. Blockchains did constitute good mechanisms for giving 
and withdrawing consent if the law was used as a base in the design phase. In the example of 
the private blockchain – Guardtime’s KSI blockchain – the author found the lawful basis for 
processing to be compliance with a legal obligation. 
 
Finally, the rights of the data subject and data persistence were analysed. Similarly as 
observed with the principles, as immutability is a core feature of the technology, it was 
outlined that both erasure and rectification are problematic in the blockchain context. Erasure 
would be possible if the nodes engaged in a “51% attack” but this would require extensive 
computational power and financial resources. This action would block the chain from 
functioning thus would not be a viable possibility for erasure. Therefore the controllers of 
blockchain technology could not comply with the requirements set forth in Article 16 and 
Article 17 due to the persistence of data on a blockchain. Still as set forth in the case Google 
Spain the right to erasure is not an absolute right, it would have to be balanced with other 
rights. Further, the author outlined several solutions, which have been proposed either in 
literature or have been seen in the market. It remains to be seen whether any of the solutions 
provide any relief to the tension with enforcement of the data subjects’ rights and blockchain 
data persistence. However, a wider interpretation of “erasure”, such as in Germany’s Data 
Protection Act, would be of benefit for blockchain compliance.  
 
In the light of the above, the hypothesis was correct partially – stemming from core 
characteristics of blockchain certain rights, such as the right to erasure and rectification, as 
well as principles are difficult to enforce. However, the fact that blockchain technology is still 
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new and developing should also be considered. As the present analysis demonstrated some 
solutions are already being deployed in order to respond to the data protection challenges. The 
present analysis also confirmed that it makes a difference in terms of compliance whether 
public or private blockchains are used, as for example the questions of controllership and 
jurisdiction are more clear in private structures.  
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Plokiahela tehnoloogia andmekaitse üldmääruse kontekstis  
Resümee 
 
Õigus andmete kaitsele on Euroopa Liidus reguleeritud andmekaitse üldmäärusega, mis 
jõustus kõikides Euroopa Liidu liikmesriikides 25. mail 2018. aastal. Kuigi määrusest 
tulenevad andmekaitse põhimõtted ja õigused peaksid olema neutraalsed kasutatava 
tehnoloogia osas, siis ei ole selge kuidas tagada määrusega vastavus plokiahela tehnoloogia 
kontekstis. Nimelt plokiahela tehnoloogia iseloomulikud jooned, nagu detsentraliseeritus, 
pidevalt kasvav andmete hulk ja nende püsivus samuti ühe kindla vastutava töötleja 
kinldaksmääramise probleem, on fundamentaalselt vastuolus andmekaitse määrusest 
tulenevate põhimõtete ja sätetega. Nii õiguskirjanduses, kui ka kohtupraktikas puudub veel 
vastus kuidas eelnimetatud vastuolu lahendada. Seega on kasoleva magistritöö 
uurimisprobleemiks vastuolu plokiahela iseloomulike joonte ja andmekaitse üldmääruse 
elementide ja neile vastavuse vahel. Magistritöö eesmärgiks on uurida kas neid kahte 
pealtnäha vastandlikku elementi on võimalik omavahel ühendada ja luua valdkonnas terviklik 
käsitlus. Tulenevalt töö eesmärgist, püstitab autor hüpoteesi, et Euroopa Liidu andmekaitse 
režiim ei ole sobiv kohalduma plokiahela tehnoloogiale. 
 
Selleks, et teemat uurida on autor esitanud kolm uurimisküsimust. Esiteks, andmekaitse 
üldmääruse sisuline kohaldamisala kohaldub andmete töötlemisele plokiahelal? Sisulise 
kohaldamisala kohustuslikeks elementideks on isikuandmed, nende automatiseeritud 
töötlemine ja Arikkel 2(2) välistavate asjaolude puudumine. Andmed, mida plokiahelal 
töödeldakse on krüpteeritud andmed ahelal ja avalikud võtmed, mis on räsitud. Andmekaitse 
üldmäärus ei kohaldu anonüümsetele andmete ehk andmetele, kuid kuna nii krüpteerimist, kui 
räsimist, käsitletakse, kui pseudonümiseerimist, siis on andmed ahelal isikuandmed. Lisaks on 
plokiahela puhul tegemist automatiseeritud andmete töötlemisega, seega on täidetud sisulise 
kohaldamisala kohustuslikud elemendid. 
 
Teiseks uurimisküsimuseks on kas plokiahelal on võimalik määrata kindlaks vastutav töötleja 
ja täita territoriaalset ulatust? Autor uurib desentraliseeritud struktuuride problemaatikat. 
Täpsemini on plokiahela puhul raske tuvastada andmete töötlejat, kuna plokiahel on 
ülesehitatud horisontaalses struktuuris, kus andmete töötlemine ja edastamine toimub igas 
arvutis, kes plokiahela alla laeb. Analüüs näitab, et loalise plokiahela puhul on vastutavat 
töötlejat kergem tuvastada. Avalike plokiahelate puhul aga, nagu näiteks Bitcoini plokiahela 
puhul on see küsimus problemaatilisem. Õiguskirjanduses ei ole seda debatti veel lahendatud. 
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Esimeseks võimaluseks on lugeda igat kasutajat vastutavaks töötlejaks, kui kasutajad 
määravad kindlaks isikuandmete töötlemise eesmärgid ja vahendid. Kuid üksik kasutaja ei saa 
plokiahela toimimist mõjutada, seega tuleks teda vastutavaks töötlejaks mitte lugeda. Teine 
võimalus on lugeda kasutajaid kaasvastutavateks töötlejateks juhul, kui nad määravad ühiselt 
kindlaks isikuandmete töötlemise eesmärgid ja vahendid. Autor leiab, et süsteemide, nagu 
Bitcoin, reeglid tulenevad üksikute kasutajate summaarsest käitumisest, mitte nende 
koordinatsioonist. Seega on kaheldav kas kasutajaid saaks lugeda kaasvastutavateks 
töötlejateks. 
 
Seejärel analüüsitakse territoriaalset kohaldamisala. Detsentraliseeritud struktuurides toimub 
andmete töötlemine ja jagamine üle mitme jurisdiktsiooni. Analüüs näitab, et Euroopa Liidus 
asutatud loaliste polkiahelate puhul kohaldub andmekaitse üldmääruse artikkel 3(1), seega on 
territoriaalne kohaldamisala täidetud. Avalike plokiahelate puhul on igaühel võimalik tarkvara 
ükskõik millisest maailma otsast alla laadida. Seega kui vastutav töötleja ei paikne Euroopa 
Liidus, peab analüüsima kas andmekaitse üldmääruse artikkel 3(2) tingimused on täidetud. 
Autor jõuab järeldusele, et andmekaitse üldmääruse territoriaalne kohaldamisala on väga lai 
ning kohaldub igal juhul ka desentraliseeritud struktuuridele.  
 
Kolmandaks otsitakse vastust küsimusele kas andmekaitse üldmäärusest tulenevaid nõudeid 
on võimalik täita plokiahelaga seoses? Vaadeldakse printsiipe, õigusi ja sikuandmete 
töötlemise seaduslikku alust. Täpsemini uuritakse õimalikult väheste andmete kogumise 
printsiipi, säilitamise piirangut ning lõimitud andmekaitse ja vaikimisi andmekaitse printsiipe. 
Plokiahela iseloomulikke jooni, nagu andmete püsivust ja pidevalt kasvavat andmete hulka on 
raske ühildada andmekaitse üldmäärusest tulenevate printsiipidega. Siiski leiab autor, et 
lahendused, nagu zero knowledge proof või andmete säilitamine plokiahela väliselt, võivad 
leevendada seda vastuolu. Samuti kirjeldatakse andmekaitse üldmäärusest tulenevaid õigusi, 
nagu õigus andmete kustutamisele ja parandamisele, mida on raske maksma panna tulenevalt 
plokiahela andmete püsivusest. Kaardistatakse võimalikud lahendused sellele probleemile. 
See, kas mõni neist lahendustest leevendab plokiahela ja andmekaitse üldmääruse vastuolu,  
selgub tulevikus. 
 
Kokkuvõttes, uuritav hüpotees pidas paika osaliselt. Tulenevalt tulenevalt plokiahela 
iseloomulikest joontest, on andmesubjektil raske teatud õigusi, nagu õigust andmete 
kustutamisele ja parandamisele, maksma panna. Samuti on ka prinitsiipide puhul. Siiski 
tuleks arvestada, et plokiahela tehnoloogia on veel uus ja arenev. Käesolev analüüs näitas, et 
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andmekaitse väljakutsetele vastamiseks on juba kasutusel mõned tehnilised lahendused. 
Käesolev analüüs kinnitas ka seda, et loaliste plokiahelate puhul on paljud andmekaitse 
küsimused selgemad.  
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List of abbreviations 
 
 
 
CJEU 
 
CJEU of Justice of the European Union 
  
DLT 
 
Distributed ledger technology 
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation 
  
ISP Internet Service Provider 
 
P2P Peer-to-peer 
 
WP29 
 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
 
CNIL 
 
French National Commission on Informatics and Liberty  
 
EDPB 
 
European Data Protection Board 
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